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DO REINDEER GAMES COUNT AS
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OF EMPLOYMENT UNDER TITLE VII?
THERESA M. BE1NER*
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991' has expanded the type of relief
available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title V1I") 2
and related legislation 3 and has solidified the theories of relief under
that law. Despite these improvements, there still is a need for gap-filling
in the way Title VII is applied. Many commentators and governmental
authorities have recognized the "glass ceiling," 4 but few have under-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, B.A., University of Virginia,
JD., Northwestern University. I would like to thank John DiPippa and C. Elizabeth Parsons for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and Stacy Fletcher, my dedicated research
assistant, for giving up her free time during the summer to help me with the research necessary
to complete this article. In addition, I would like to thank Kathryn Fitzhugh, Melissa Serfass, jada
Aitchison and the library staff at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock fur their unflagging
support of my research.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
3 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1996); 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117
(1988). The ADEA prohibits discrimination in employment of those age 40 and older. See generally
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Sections 1981 and 1983 prohibit discrimination in employment contracts
based on race and discrimination, respectively, under color or state law. See generally 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983. The ADA prohibits discrimination by employers against qualified disabled persons.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-121[7.
1 Congress recognized the glass ceiling as a real phenomenon, leading to legislation to
further delineate and identify the problem. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L, No. 102-166,
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taken an examination of ways to control and eliminate some of the
employer practices that lead to the glass ceiling using current Title VII
jurisprudence.' Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") prohibit
discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment."6 Yet, aside from the notable expansion of Title VII into sexual
harassment,' few litigants have used Title VII as a creative weapon of
attack for many pervasive employer practices that greatly undermine
the success and promotional opportunities of employees who fall into
the traditional protected classes. 8 While case law makes clear that
terms, conditions or privileges include benefits such as insurance and
pension plans, 9 few courts and litigants have addressed what I call
"reindeer games."
Title II, The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, § 202(a) (I )—(2), 105 Stat. 1081; U.S. Diu , 'T OF LABOR, A
REPORT ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE I (1991); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gehl,
Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31
Hous. L REV. 1517, 1520 (1995) (discussing the glass ceiling and Title VI l's flffittre to aid women
in breaking through it); Grace M. Giese], The Business Client Is a Woman: The Effect of Women as
In-House Counsel on Women in Law Firms and the. Legal Profession, 72 NE's. L. REV. 760, 761 (1993)
("[T] he presence of female in-house attorneys may lessen or eliminate barriers to success which
women in law firms have traditionally faced,"); Daniel Gyebi, The. Civil Rights Act of 1991: Favoring
Women and Minorities in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases Involving High -LevelJobs, 36 How.
LJ. 97, 112
-14 (1993) (arguing for application of Civil Rights Act of 1991 and affirmative action
to eliminate glass ceiling); Mark S. Kende, Shatter the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking
Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 17, 18 (1994) (suggesting alternatives
to Title VII liability in the context of women law firm partners).
5 Some scholars have argued for application of Title VII to more novel types of claims. See,
e.g., Gyebi, supra note 4, at 112-14 (arguing for extended use of affirmative action to eliminate
glass ceiling); Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 418 (1980) (arguing for making stereotyping a
per se violation of Title VII).
6 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(1988).
7 See Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
13 By "traditional protected classes," I refer to the groups that the anti-discrimination laws
were mainly aimed at women and minorities. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
535 (1982) (women); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978) (racial
minorities); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (women); Affirmative Action
Review, Report to President Clinton, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 139, § 2.1 (1995). The focus of
this article, however, is on sex discrimination in part because discrimination against women often
takes more subtle forms. This makes it more difficult to hold employers liable for acts that are
harmful to the employment opportunities of women. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) (justifying finding of sex discrimination by noting
that similar employer policy, if aimed at race, would clearly violate Title VII); Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626-27 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,J., dissenting) (arguing that claimant made
out sexual harassment claim where conduct, if anti-semitic or racially motivated, would have been
actionable).
9 See, e.g., Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)
(insurance); Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710-11 (pension plan); Chastang v. Flynn Emrich Co., 541 F.2d
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The term reindeer games refers to outside activities that give
employees exposure to persons with power at their place of employ-
ment. I am using the term reindeer games from the holiday song,
"Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer."'" For those of you unfamiliar with
the song, Rudolph was ostracized by his fellow reindeer because he was
different—he.had a red nose. Because of this difference, Rudolph was
not permitted to join in any "reindeer games," which included instruc-
tion on flying techniques as well as opportunities to "bond" with other
young reindeer. Those reindeer games were a prerequisite for any
young reindeer to be considered for the highest position within the
North Pole community, leading Santa's sleigh. 11 An example of a rein-
deer game in the employment context would be golfing with the boss
or having lunch with a supervisor. While many might view these sorts
of reindeer games as trivial, for those, like Rudolph, who are left out,
the career ramifications can be quite palpable."
At first glance, reindeer games do not appear particularly heinous.
After all, it is natural for employees to form friendships at work.
However, the nefarious effects of reindeer games become apparent
after a review of sociological data regarding the perception of women
in the workplace and a common sense analysis of how these games can
affect employment decisions.
Two aspects of reindeer games cause problems for employees who
are non-participants. First, these outside activities generally give the
participating employee a "leg up" from increased exposure to the boss
or others in power. Second, even if' a non-participating employee is
given an opportunity to participate, he or she may have no interest in
the particular activity involved. This may lead the boss to think the
employee is "not a team player," and result in adverse employment
decisions with respect to that employee. A decision not to play golf,
1040 (4th Cir. 1976) (profit sharing and retirement plan); Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 483 F.al
490, 492 n.3 (5th Cii.) (pension plan), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); liartmess v. Drcwrys
U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 1971) (retirement plan).
mAs the song goes, 101 of the other reindeer used to laugh and call him names. They
never let poor Rudolph join in any reindeer games." fly referring to this phenomenon as a
"game," 1 do not mean to trivialize its impact on employment opportunities. Rather, the term
"game" is appropriate because these activities arc not obviously work-related and, instead, are
often considered part of "playing the game" that leads to success. in addition, they often have a
game component, e.g., golfing, playing softball, etc.
tt The analogy is not perfect, because there was an instruction (or training) component to
the reindeer games—reindeer learned how to fly. In the employment context, discrimination in
training opportunities clearly implicates a term, condition, or privilege of employment and,
therefore, violates Title VII. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
12 Rudolph experienced emotional harm from being ostracized from the reindeer games and
actually ran away from home, considering himself a "misfit."
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however, obviously has no effect on an employee's ability, for example,
to fill out and file a tax return on behalf of a client. Nevertheless, the
reindeer games phenomenon often gives effect to what are non-job-re-
lated criteria.
While both Congress and learned legal scholars have addressed
concerns regarding the "glass ceiling" that keeps both women and
minorities from advancing within corporate America," no one has
addressed whether Title VII may be an effective tool in remedying the
inequities, and the consequential disparity in advancement, resulting
from reindeer games . 14 In this article, I suggest several ways in which
litigants'' could use Title VII as a means of addressing inequities that
result from a lack of participation in reindeer games. As a starting
point, I review sociological data that indicates why reindeer games are
important in career advancement. From there, 1 review the meaning
given by courts to the phrase "term, condition or privilege of employ-
ment" under Title VII. Based on current usage by the courts, I suggest
ways that potential plaintiffs can use Title VII as a means of addressing
the unfairness that often results from reindeer games. Finally, I look
to the potential for reform in the law so that reindeer games them-
selves, and not simply their effects, can be eliminated and working
persons can be assured of equal treatment in the workplace.
I. WHY ARE REINDEER GAMES So IMPORTANT?
The influence of reindeer games on employment decisions as well
as on an employee's success in his or her job is obvious. Anyone who
has worked has seen what happens to the boss's favorites. These indi-
viduals get the better assignments, the better offices, and eventually
the better raises and promotions.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, these individuals
often are "cut slack" where others are not. If a "favorite" makes an
error, it is often excused, while the error of someone not occupying
13 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
"See, e,g., Paetzhcild & Gehl, supra note 4, at 1520 (noting Title VII's failure to aid women
in breaking through glass ceiling); see also Gyebi, supra note 4, at 114-18, 130-37 (arguing that
affirmative action could he used to eliminate some effects of glass ceiling).
15 I focus on the plight of women, because there is consensus on the existence of a glass
ceiling that stalls their advancement in employment. However, the same logic applies to minori-
ties. Further, there is no reason why a white male could not use the methodologies examined in
this article in an appropriate case. However, the courts have been reluctant to recognize certain
types of discrimination as applicable to males. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochetn N. Am., 28 F,3d
446,451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (male on male sexual harassment does not violate Title VII); Hopkins
v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Stipp. 822, 833 (D. Md. 1994) (same). But see Quick v.
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"favorite" status is not similarly excused. Reindeer games allow an
individual employee to develop that "favorite" status by prolonged
exposure to the boss or supervisors in a low stress environment. The
result is that, instead of perceiving the Favored employee as simply an
employee, he or she becomes a friend.'" It is much more difficult to
fire or demote a friend than it is to fire or demote a mere "employee."
Likewise, it gives the boss more pleasure to see his or her friends
succeed than those who enjoy only employee status.'' In addition, the
favorite employee can benefit from the mentor relationship that natu-
rally develops due to participation in reindeer games.' 8
In addition, reindeer games have an effect on those who refuse
to participate. Many women are burdened with both career and family
duties. 1 • Although more males are becoming involved in parenting
obligations, the responsibility for children still falls disproportionately
on working women. 2" Because of this, women often have less time and
inclination to participate in reindeer games even if asked. Further,
many women do not engage in the same outside activities as their
Donaldson Co., 895 F. Stapp. 1288, 1294 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (acknowledging that Title VII protects
males from sexual harassment, while granting suniniary judgment in case of male on male
harassment); Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211-12 (D.R.1. 1991) (male
on male harassment), Like harassment law, the main beneficiaries of the extension of 'Ude V11
to reindeer games likely would he those who have been traditionally discriminated against, i.e.,
women and mitawities.
Pi This also works against women when the contact involves clients. Women lawyers, in
particular, have difficulty becoming "rainmakers"—the most powerful position in the law thin—
due to the lack of business contacts that can be developed through reindeer games. See Kende,
supra note 4, at 37 n.80.
17 1 use "he" and "his" throughamt this article to refer to bosses and supervisors, because nlost
upper level managers are, in kid, male. For example, according to recent statistics, 95-97% of
Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 senior 'managers are male. Female and Minority Executives Face
Glass (Concrete?) Ceiling, 13 RF.S. ALERT No. 14 (July 21, 1995); we also U.S. DE'F'T' or LABOR, A
RF•owr ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE 0 (1991) (minorities and women hold less than 5%
of top managerial positions in top 1000 largest American corporations) (citing KoRN/FERRY
INTERNATIoNni. & Jo! IN F.. ANDERSON GRADUATE SG1300.1., OF MANAGEMENT, KORN/FERRY INTER-
NATIONAL'S EXECUTIVE PROFILE 1990: A SURVEY OF CORPORATE LEA muss (1990)).
18 See David N, Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, Workplace Mentoring in the Legal Pro fission, 61
S. EcoN.,J. 783, 784 (1995) (studies show individuals with mentors have greater job satisfaction
and earn more than those without mentors).
19 Jane R. Wilkie, Marriage, Family, Life, and Women's Employment, in WOMEN Wt IRKING
153-55 (St romberg & Harkess eds., 2d ed. 1988). Wilkie notes that this is changing, and men are
taking on more household responsibilities, although male participation dine still does not equal
the time spent by women with such responsibilities. Id.; see also Arlie Hochschild, 77w Awful
Quandary of Working  Mothers for Labor Day, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 1989, at Fl.
1 Mary F. RadfOrd, Sex Sterrotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
liAsTuw.s 1.4 471, 500 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges
and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1748-49 & n.80, 1772 & n.202 (1991); Wilkie, supra
note 19, at 153-55; Hochshild, supra note l9, at Fl (recounting statistics showing that working
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mostly male bosses. 21
 For example, the number of men who golf greatly
exceeds the number of women who hold that interest.22 For these
reasons, even if a boss invited a woman to golf with him, it is unlikely
that she would be able to participate and/or be interested in partici-
pating. The result of her failure to participate can be just as devastating
to her career as not being invited to participate: the loss of the oppor-
tunity to get to know the boss better and benefit from the boss's viewing
her as an individual and not just another worker. This could lead to a
valuable mentor relationship with the boss." In addition, there is the
added stigma of not being a "team player" because she is not interested
in participating." Yet, a woman's ability or desire to play golf has no
impact on her ability to do her job.
mothers spend more time on housework than their male partners). See also U.S. MERrr SYS.
PROTECTIONS Bo., A QUESTION OF EQUITY: WOMEN AND THE GLASS CEILING IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 21 (1992) (noting that women with children received fewer promotions than
women without children and fewer than men regardless of whether they had children). The
number of working mothers with small children has increased according to studies, to anywhere
from 60% to 80%. See After-School Care: Two Sides Have Their Day, ATLANTA j. & CONST., Sept.
15, 19%, at 1; Della DaLafuente, Family Illness Hard on Workers Study: Sick Leave Oflen
Inadequate, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 1996, at 4 (noting that 75.9% of women in workforce have
school age children); Jackie Ripley, More Bu.sy Couples Are ?liming to Nannies, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at B6 (noting that 60% of women with children under age six work outside
of home).
21
 NATI. SPORTING GOODS ASS'N, SPORTS PARTICIPATION 258 (1992) (showing that far fewer
women participate in traditional male sports activities such as baseball, basketball, fishing, hunt-
ing and golf).
22 According to National Sporting Goods Association statistics, 18,459,000 men golf, while
only 5,562,000 women golf. Id. Indeed, even if a woman did want to play golf, she might be
perceived negatively for possessing what can be characterized as a "less feminine' trait. See
Radford, supra note 20, at 502-03. 1 will leave the discussion of whether this is based on nature
or nurture to other commentators. See generally, C. GILLIGAN. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 306-15 (1989); Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality,
and the Law: The Legal Significance, of Biological Sex Differences, 38 Sw. L.J. 617 (1984); Christine
A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Catherine MacKinnon,
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law
—A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 11. 27 (1985).
23 See Giesel, supra note 4, at 777-79 (noting that few women attorneys have mentors and
that this has had detrimental effects on their careers).
24
 A similar phenomenon occurs based on economic status. Golfing is generally considered
a "rich man's sport." See NATIONAL. SPORTING Goons, supra note 21, at 258 (the majority of
persons who play golf earn over $35,000/year). Those from more economically disadvantaged
backgrounds, therefbre, likely have had little to no exposure to the sport. Id. Women make on
average less than white males, Affirmative Action Review, Report to President Clinton, 1995 Daily
Lab. Rep. (RNA) 139, § 4.1 (1995). With so many minorities living below the poverty line as
compared to their white counterparts, this no doubt has an impact upon minority employees
similar to the one that it has upon female employees. See id. (33.3% of African Americans and
29.3% of Hispanics live in poverty; 11.6% of whites live in poverty). For an example of the "team
player" analysis affecting an employment decision, see Ezold v. Wolf, 751 E Stipp. 1175, 1178
(E.D. Pa. 1990), revel, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992).
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Even in situations in which the reindeer game has no obvious
effect on firing, promotions and related employment decisions, it does
have a psychological effect on those who are not asked to participate."
The reasonable conclusions to be drawn from being excluded is that
the boss does not like that employee or, at least, likes other employees
more. The less favored employee believes that her being "left out"
signals a less favored status that might have an effect on her ability to
succeed at that place of employment. This can be demoralizing and
can lead to frustration, causing the employee's job performance to
suffer." The situation becomes exacerbated for the less favored em-
ployee if that perception is validated by increased opportunities and
promotions for those having favorite status. This results in a higher
turnover rate for women because they believe advancement is not
possible.27
While there is little direct sociological data on the effects of rein-
deer games on promotions, anecdotal evidence suggests their impor-
tance in promotional opportunities." The federal government, in a
study of federal employees, noted the role reindeer games play in
advancement and related career opportunities. As one woman who
participated in the study commented:
We have a [high official], , his subordinate supervisor, and
several of their supervisors who go jogging together. And I'm
hearing rumblings from some of the women in the branch
that if one of those male subordinates gets an advancement,
they're going to see it as quid pro quo for having jogged with
their supervisor and their supervisor's supervisor, regardless
of whether they discuss business. 29
28 See, e.g., Soto v. Adams Elevator Equip. Co., 941 F.2d 543,546-47 (7th Cir. 1991) (recount-
ing plaintiff's stress due to ostracism, including failure to invite her to company Christmas party
and to buy her birthday cake).
26 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segrega-
tion in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HAnv. L. REv.
1749,1829 (1990). Indeed, studies have shown that "women's work aspirations and orientations
are .. shaped by their opportunities for mobility and the social organization of their jobs." Id.
27 Unfortunately, the high turnover rate often justifies employers' stereotyped thinking about
women—specifically that they are not as dedicated to their careers. See Paetzold & Gelu, supra
note 4, at 1547-48; see also Schultz, supra note 26, at 1825-27 (noting that women often leave
higher level jobs).
28 See, e.g., GLASS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL. USE OF THE NATION'S
HUMAN CAPITAL 33-34 (1995) (describing anecdotal evidence of reindeer games and their effects
on the advancement of women); COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A.S.A. REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 11-12 (1988) (describing reindeer games in context of women lawyers).
29 U.S. MERIT Svs. PROTECTION BD., supra note 20, at 25.
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In a study of the practices of nine corporations, the United States
Department of Labor's Report on the Glass Ceiling acknowledges
that casual interviews, including lunches and dinners with potential
job applicants, were part of the promotion and recruitment prac-
tices that tended to favor men."
Recent studies regarding gender distinctions made in the employ-
ment context demonstrate that sex discrimination is prevalent, if per-
haps a bit subtle, making it all the more important for women to have
equal opportunities in all aspects of the employment relationship."
Other scholars have recounted the social science data through the late
1980s, which showed significant discrimination against women in em-
ployment. 32 Unfortunately, more recent studies show that women have
not made the gains necessary to reach parity with men, let alone crash
through the "glass ceiling." 33 Studies show that, in certain circum-
stances, women do not enjoy parity with regards to promotions, 34 are
not perceived to have the qualities necessary to be good managers,"
and are victims of an ever-widening gender gap, even in salary.'"
Oddly enough, the legal community (including legal academia)
is a leader in discrimination against women.37 Women are half as likely
to become law firm partners. 38 While women are making gains in
30
 U.S. DEP'T OF LAISOK, supra note 17, at 18-22; see also Patricia A. Roos & Barbara F. Reskin,
Institutional Factors Contributing to Sex Segregation in the Workplace, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATION, REMEDIES 252 (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 1984).
31
 There is a significant amount of research on entrance barriers to the employment of
women. See Roos Sc Reskin, supra note 30, at 235.
32 See, e.g., Radford, supra note 20, at 489-503 (describing sociological and psychological
evidence of sex stereotyping in employment contexts); Taub, supra note 5, at 349-61. In describ-
ing "recent" studies, I have attempted to gather the most recent data on differences in perceptions
of, and actual employment gains made hy, women in the workplace.
33 See U.S. DEPT OE LABOR, supra note 17, at 1; Kende, supra note 4, at 18-21 (describing
phenomenon in context of women lawyers).
54
 Stephen" Spurr, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: A Study of Promotion, 43 iNDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 406, 415 (1990),
55
 Virginia E. Schein et al., The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Man-
agement Characteristics Among College Students, 20 SEX ROLES 103, 108-09 (1989) (both male
managers and male management students believe men are more likely to possess characteristics
necessary for managerial success); see also Radford, supra note '20, at 496-99 (recounting earlier
studies showing similar results).
3' John Hagan, The Gender Stratification of Income Inequality Among Lawyers, 68 Soc. FORCES
835, 849 (1990) (study of lawyers in Toronto, Canada). But see Affirmative Action Review, Report
to President Clinton 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 139, § 3.2.2 (1995) (recounting data that suggests
no wage gap if salaries are controlled for experience and education levels).
37 See Giesel, supra note 4, at 776-86 (describing discrimination experienced by female
associates); Kende, supra note 4, at 24-41 (discussing history of discrimination against women in
legal profession).
58 Spurr, supra note 34, at 409, 415; see Giesel, supra note 4, at 774-86.
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entry-level hiring, they have not broken through into the partnership
ranks with the same ease as men." As was noted in a law firm partner-
ship study, women must meet a higher standard for promotion, "either
because of male lawyers' preference for male business associates, or
because of the preferences of clients for male lawyers, or both.") Even
taking into account factors such as school rank and quality of law
school, women are not. succeeding at the same rate as men, leading
one social scientist to conclude that the "evidence tends to refute an
explanation of promotion differences based on the consequences of
affirmative action."'" As one group of researchers reported:
In private sector workplaces, almost one-half [of women stud-
ied] report inequities in salary and promotion and believe
that their assignments, and therefore their opportunities, are
restricted. Regardless of where they work, disparagement is
pervasive, and, for certain women, the risk of being harassed
is high. Consequently, within the context of their daily work,
many are forced to cope with situations in which their aspi-
rations are thwarted and their professional standing sub-
verted. 42
Likewise, studies have shown that, even controlling for factors such
as years in academia, gender negatively affects tenure decisions for
female legal academics.°
Studies indicate that gender segregation in job classifications has
not been reduced significantly within the overall workforce hierarchy.'"
Indeed, white men "enjoy greater access than do educated members
39 Spurr, supra note 34, at 411 (noting that affirmative action has helped to increase hiring
of women).
' 1" id at 412.
'11 Id. at 411-12,
'9. Rosenberg et al„ Now That We Are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and Harassment
at Work and the Experience of Women Larrrrs, 7 Gi:NnEu & SOC'Y 415, 428-29 (1993).
41 Bruce 0. Fisher et al., Effects  of Gender and Other Factors on the Rank of Late Prvfessors in
Colleges of Business: Evidence of a Glass Ceiling, 12 J. Bus. ETtncs 771, 776 (1993) (study of law
professors in business colleges). In addition, gender has an impact upon students' perfbrmances
in law school. See i„,returrally l.ani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One
Ivy League Law Schoo4 143 U. PA, L. REV. I (1994); Suzanne Horner & Lois Schwartz, Admitted
But No! Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WoMeN's L.J. I, 4 n.7
(1989) (citing studies of women's experiences or alienation in law school); Catherine Weiss &
Louise Melling, The Legal Education qf Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. Rev. 1299 (1988) (describing
alienation of women attending law school). But see LINDA E. WIGICIMAN, WOMEN IN LEGAL
EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF LAW SCI1001, PERFORMANCE AND LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCES OF
MEN AND WOMEN (1996) (showing a "modest difference" in first year grades for men and women).
'1 '1 SeeThomas L. Steiger Sc Mark Wardell, Gender and Employment in the Service Sector, 42 Soc.
Ptums. 91, 93 ( l995) (studies cited).
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of other groups to jobs that entail a degree of subjective evaluation for
hiring and promotion. "45 Women with increased education do not
make the same sorts of gains that men make. 4°
Yet, the promotion of women into the upper ranks of business,
including law firm partnerships, has been linked to the success of other
women within that same organization. In the context of law school
faculties, it has been observed that "the presence of a certain size core
of tenured [female] faculty significantly improves the likelihood that
junior level women will successfully leap the tenure hurdle." 47 In addi-
tion, more women at a business or in a particular job reduces the
effects of tokenism, which leads to members of less dominant groups
(in this case, women) being treated as symbols representing the char-
acteristics of their particular group rather than being treated as indi-
viduals. 48 Finally, men who have had experience with women in author-
ity positions tend to be more accepting of women in the work place
than men who have not. 49 Therefore, the presence of women in the
upper levels of employment is important to the success and acceptance
of women as managers.
Several sociologists researching this topic conclude that affirma-
tive action efforts have not been wholly effective for women 5° and,
therefore, that affirmative action efforts should be maintained. 5 ' Stud-
ies indicate that, rather than leading to the promotion of women,
affirmative action might well have had the opposite effect. In a 1989
study of male and female management students, social scientists found
45 Mary C. King, Occupational Segregation by Race and Sex, 1940-88, 115 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
30, 35 (1992).
46 Randy P. Albelda, Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender; 1958 -1981, 39 Nous. &
LA IL REL. REv. 404, 410 (1986).
47 Richard Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women. on American Law School
Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537, 550 (1988).
18 See Terri C. Fain & Douglas L. Anderton, Sexual Harassment: Organizational Context and
Diffuse Status, 17 SEx Roms 291, 293 (1987) (studies cited). One study in particular discussed
the difficulties attributable to women lawyers in terms of tokenism. P. MacCorquodale & G.
Jensen, Women in the Law: Partners or Tokens? 7 GENDER & SOC'Y 582 (1993). The concept of
tokenism was first identified and discussed by Kanter, who argued that in balanced groups only
will organizational outcomes for individuals depend more on structural and personal factors than
on the dynamics established by the group itself. For more on her theory, see ROSABETH M.
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN Or THE CORPORATION (1977). See also Radford, supra note 20, at
500-01 (discussing tokenism); Taub, supra note 5, at 358-59 (same).
45J. Siltanen, Visual Cues and Gendered Thinking, 6 Soc. STUD. REV. 56, 57 (1990).
51) See, e.g., Schein at al., supra note 35, at 109; Spurr, supra note 34, at 412; Steiger & Wardell,
supra note 44, at 106.
51 O.C. Brenner et al., The. Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management
Characteristics Revisited, 32 ACAD. Mcm .r. J. 662, 668 (1989).
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that male students perceived management positions in the same way
as male managers who were already working: management positions
required characteristics that men were more likely to possess than
women.52 The authors of the study opined that a male "may perceive
the increased competition from women as a threat both to his self-es-
teem and to his career opportunities. Hence, he may resist such [affir-
mative action] efforts, making the possibility of change remote." 53 The
authors concluded that the results of their study "suggest that the
structural mechanisms and legal actions designed to circumvent biased
attitudes and provide women equal opportunity in the workplace may
well have to remain in place for some time to come."" Indeed, one
social scientist has documented that white men consciously and actively
resist equal opportunities for women and minorities in the workplace."
These studies show that women still face significant barriers to
advancement and that stereotypical beliefs regarding the success of
women managers help to create those barriers. The use of subjective
criteria in upper level management decisions exacerbates the situ-
ation." Reindeer games have their fullest effect in instances of subjec-
tive decision making. When a decision is subjective, the decision maker
has the most leeway to let personal influences, including the effects of
reindeer games, inform the decision making process. In addition,
regardless of that effect, reindeer games undoubtedly undermine the
less favored employee's (here, women) psychological well-being on the
job as well as her status among fellow employees. On these bases, the
importance of reindeer games should not be minimized. Indeed, it
seems natural that they would be encompassed in employer activities
that are prohibited under Title VII.
52 Schcin et al., supra note 35, at 108-109.
53 1d. at 109.
51 Id. In a study of male and female managers, Brenner, Tomkiewicz and Schein showed that
female managers' perception of appropriate characteristics for managers has changed. Brenner
et al., supra note 51, at 662. %Virile their earlier study had shown that both men and women
believed that typical male characteristics were necessary kw good managers, their updated study
showed that worrier' believed characteristics possessed by both men and women were necessary
for good managers. Id. This shift shows some progress for perceptions on the part of women in
the workplace; however, given that most promotion decisions arc made by men, the gains for
women based on these changes may not he all that significant, See id. at 668.
55 See C. COCKBURN, IN THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN'S RESISTANCE To Sex EQUALITY IN
ORGANIZATIONS (1992).
56 See Gyebi, supra note 4, at 114-18 (describing subjective evaluations and their impact on
glass ceiling).
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II. REINDEER GAMES AS A TERM, CONDITION OR PRIVILEGE OF
EMPLOYMENT FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
Title VII can be expanded to include reindeer games if they fall
within the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" that Title
VII explicitly covers. Title VII provides that "[i] t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 57
 The language of this section is
extremely broad; it appears on its face to apply to a vast array of
employer practices. While the courts have repeatedly emphasized the
broad nature of the "terms, conditions, or privileges" language,• its
exact parameters remain unrefined. Indeed, for purposes of Title VII,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has not
even attempted to define the terms." However, a review of how the
courts have used these terms helps to determine how reindeer games
can result in Title VII violations.
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). In addition, Title VII prohibits an employer from
limiting, segregating or classifying his employees in any way that would "deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's nice, color, religion, sex, or national origin." M. § 2000e-
2(a) (2). Courts have used this section for expansion of Title VII into disparate impact claims,
which require no intent to discriminate on the part of the employer. See, e.g., Connecticut V. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 448 n.9 (1982) (using this section to analyze disparate impact claims). It may be
easier to infer intent from reindeer games because the employer is making a distinct choice to
prefer men to women. In this regard, it does not make sense to say, for example, that a male
supervisor does not intend to ask only males to play golf with him. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) ( )(A) (1994) (applying disparate impact to "employment practiceki" generally); Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1985 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying disparate impact to English-only
policy, which court admitted was out of mainstream of cases under Section 703(a) (2) of Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) ("Section 703") ); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380,
387 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying impact to filthy toilets insofar as practice had adverse impact on
women). Commentators have argued that Title VII, as currently used and applied, has been
insufficient to ensure the advancement of women through the glass ceiling. See, Paetzold &
Gelu, supra note 4, at 1546-49. While this might be true to date, my position in this article is that
there are natural extensions of Title VII that can increase its effectiveness in combatting many
forms of discrimination that lead to the glass ceiling.
58 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Keenan v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 707 F.2(11274, 1276 ( 1 I di Cir. 1983); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993)
(noting Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality).
55 11 has, however, set out a list of unlawful activities for purposes of the. ADA. This definition
includes discrimination based on "selection and financial support for 	 professional meetings,
conferences and other 1 -elated activities	 land alctivities sponsored by a covered entity includ-
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A. Employer Activity for Purposes of Title VII
Before delving into the courts' interpretations of these terms in
specific contexts, a preliminary problem of interpretation must be
resolved because of the context in which reindeer games occur. Obvi-
ously, there must be some sort of employer action or practice at issue
before a reindeer game could be actionable as a term, condition, or
privilege of employment. The language extends to "unlawful employ-
ment practices" of an employerw Thus, the question of who is an em-
ployer for purposes of Title VII is relevant.
While Title VII encompasses the acts of "agents of employers"
within its proscription of discriminatory practices,"' it is not clear how
this language will work in the context of reindeer games. In the hypo-
thetical situations posited thus far in this article, the supervisors have
engaged in activities with subordinates outside of work. While actions
of supervisors are often imputed to the employer under Title VII, this
generally is limited to situations in which the supervisor is acting within
the scope of his employment." 2 If reindeer games play a part in the
supervisor's decision with respect to the employee's status as an em-
ployee, that supervisor is acting within the scope of his employment in
taking into consideration that reindeer game. In addition, if the rein-
deer game encompasses some employment-related activity, Ibr exam-
ple, if there is a discussion of work-related problems or issues at lunch
or the employer pays for lunch, this would appear to be an employer
action for purposes of Title VII. This is perhaps the easiest manner in
ing social and recreational programs." 29 	 §§ 1630.4(g)—(h) (1990). This regulation does
include certain types of reindeer games within its proscription of discrimination in social and
recreational programs. See id. In addition, the regulation includes a catch-all applying it. to "I a ny
other term, condition, or privilege of employment." M. § 1630.4(i).
It seems natural to include social and recreational programs within the terms or conditi ons
of employment with respect tcidiserimhiation based on disability. Because the ADA covers physical
disabilities that might affect an employee's ability to participate, 1Or example, on die employer's
company softball team, it makes sense that the EEOC would promulgate a regitlation that
encompassed such terms or conditions. It is far less obvious that women, because of their status
as women, would not be permitted to participate. In practice, however, women often are not
asked to play.
6" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ( ) (1988) (emphasis added).
61 Id. § 2000e(b).
62 See Mmitar, 477 U.S. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or At; ENcv §§ '219-37 (1955)
and advising court to use agency principles in assessing employer liability). There is a signilleant
amount of confusion in the courts rega rding employers' liability for harassment by their employ-
ees. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the !Exasperating: Title VII Liability JOY Em-
ployers. for Sexual Harassment Commitled by Their Supervisors, 81 CoRNELL REV. 116, 72 (1995).
For more on agency principles underlying sexual harassment law, see inlizt notes 230-57 and
accompanying text.
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which to hold reindeer games actionable under Title VII—when they
are linked to some other employment-related decision. Perhaps not
coincidentally, this is the area in which the courts have held less clear
employer activities actionable.
B. "Normal" Terms, Conditions, or Privileges of Employment
Title VII itself refers to the most obvious "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" that are actionable in its proscription of
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national
origin by failing or refusing to hire, to discharge, or to compensate
persons similarly.° After its reference to these fundamental employ-
ment-related actions, Congress apparently used the more general
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" language as a catch-all
to cover other discriminatory activities." Most courts either simply have
assumed that an employment practice constituted a "term, condition,
or privilege of employment" or perfunctorily have concluded that the
alleged practice fell within those terms.
With the notable exceptions of sexual and racial harassment," the
courts have not been creative in their approach to what they consider
a term, condition, or privilege of employment for purposes of Title
VII. Prior to Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, Hishon v. King & Spauld-
ing was the case in which the United States Supreme Court addressed
what constitutes a "term, condition, or privilege of employment. "66 I n
Hishon, the Court at first adopted a contractual approach to those
terms. While adopting a liberal notion of when such a contract is
formed,67 the Court explained that it was the "contractual relationship
of employment" that triggered the "provision of Title VII governing
`terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.'" 68 Therefore, the
underlying employment contract defined what fell within the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" and "clearly include [d]
benefits that are part of an employment contract." 69
63 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1).
" Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 436 F. Stipp. 1184,1193 n.11 (0. Md. 1977) (acknowledging
the phrase as a "catch-all provision").
65 A more detailed discussion of the expansion of "terms, conditions, or privileges" into the
harassment area 1011ows. See infra notes 135-76 and accompanying text.
66 467 U.S. 69,74 (1984).
67 Id. The Court explained that such a contract could be written or oral, formal or informal.
Id. Indeed, "the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a workplace" can
amount to a contract of employment. Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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From there, the Hishon Court expanded what could be considered
a "term, condition, or privilege of employment." As the Court ex-
plained, an actual contractual term is not necessary:
An employer may provide its employees with many benefits
that it is under no obligation to furnish by any express or
implied contract. Such a benefit, though not a contractual
right of employment may qualify as a "privileg[e]" of employ-
ment under Title VII. A benefit that is part and parcel of the
employment relationship may not be doled out in a discrimi-
natory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the
employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all."
The plaintiff in Hishon did not have a written contract with her law
firm. 71 Instead, the Court gave effect to what amounted to an oral
obligation to consider her for partnership.
An easy expansion from Hishon is to define the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment as whatever is set out in an employee or
personnel manual. Some jurisdictions recognize implied contracts
based on statements made in such manuals. 72 However, even though
employee manuals often extensively cover the terms of an employment
relationship, reindeer games, with their social component, are not
likely to be covered.
Aside from contract-related cases, the first area of expansion of
Title VII from the run-of-the-mill hire/fire/differential pay situations
was into employment actions that were closely linked to these basic
three. For example, promotions were considered to fall within em-
ployer activities covered by Title VII." Promotions are generally linked
to pay increases and constitute a type of internal hiring. Therefore,
they are easily encompassed within Title VII's proscription against
discriminatory practices. 74 Likewise, refusals to reinstate, linkable to
7° Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
71 HiShan, 467 U.S. at 71-72.
72 See, e.g., Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 250 (Ala. 1994); Duklulao V. Saint
Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987). But see Atkins v. Industrial Telecomm. Ass'n,
Inc., 600 A.2d 885, 891 (D.C. 1995) (employee manual with unequivocal disclaimers did not
create binding contract); Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 1995); Figueroa
v. West, 902 S,W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Criminal Sheriff, 19 E3d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1994); Scales v. J.C.
Bradford Co., 925 F.2d 901, 910 (Gth Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 536 (6th Cir.
1981); I'olice Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
74 See, e.g., Hishon, 467 U.S. 69, 75; Lucid() v. Cravath, Swaine Sc Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123,
l27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (partnership decision).
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terminations, were also considered covered by Title VII. 75
 In addition,
other practices related to terminations, such as reprimands, layoffs,
and discipline policies, fell within Title VIPs ambit. 76
Conditions attendant to on-the-job opportunities, such as train-
ing77
 and shift differentials (including hours of employment as well as
work assignments) 78
 were considered within the scope of "terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment." 79
 All of these conditions or terms
of employment can be linked to promotional opportunities. The best
shifts and assignments usually go to the best workers: those who are at
the "top" of their fields. In addition, training opportunities are directly
linked to an employee's ability to move up within a company, as they
provide the employee with the abilities he or she needs to succeed and
rise internally. Therefore, none of these types of terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment were too far a reach for the courts.
Beyond those employer practices that could be linked to hiring
and firing, courts also placed employer practices that essentially af-
fected compensation within Title \ill's proscribed activities. The most
notable expansion was in the area of benefits." Courts have held that
Title VII covered profit sharing and retirement plans. 8 ' In addition,
75
 Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 409 (2d Cir. 1975); Al-Hamdani v. State Univ. of New
York, 438 F. Supp. 299, 301 (W.D.N.Y 1977); see also Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d
202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to reconsider denial of tenure).
76
 Keenan v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 707 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1983) (discharge and
discipline policies); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D, 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (layoff, demotion and
discharge).
77 See, e.g, Langston v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 1990 WL 129567 (N.D. III. 1990); Holden v.
Burlington N„ Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1398, 1410-11 (D. Minn. 1987).
78
 Met/. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1994)
(redistribution of brokentge accounts); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 180, 184-85
(6th Cir.) (reassignment for one day), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 931 (1992); O'Connor v. Peru State
College, 781 F.2d 632, I134-35 (8th Cit. 1986) (college coach assigned heavier load of classes and
outside ditties); EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 1981) (difference in pay for lunch
hoots); Langston, 1990 WL 129567 (inequities in assignments); Pima, 70 F.R.D, 378 (discrimina-
tory assignments).
79 Criminal Sheriff 19 F.3d at 241; Viene v. Swiss Grand Hotel, 1994 WI, 118514 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (hours of employment); Holden, 665 F. Supp. 1398 (assignments); Elva, 70 F.R.D. 378
(assignments).
8" Keenan, 707 F.2d at 1277. While cowls have lumped certain "terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment" into the term "fringe benefits," or simply "benefits," ii is debatable as to
what these terms cover. Therefore, the use of alai term has not really clarified what is meant by
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
81
 City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1978) (pension plan); Chastang v.
Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1043 (4th Cir. 1976) (profit sharing and retirement plan);
Peters v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490, 495-98 (Sib Cir.) (pension plan), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
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insurance programs were considered covered." The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Keenan v. American. Cast Iron Pipe Co., charac-
terized credit given employees without reprimands on their records as
a "fringe benefit."'" The Keenan court, to determine whether the credit
program fell within its ambit, quoted from the EEOC guidelines defin-
ing that term: "'Fringe benefits,' as used herein, includes medical,
hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-shar-
ing and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.""' The court reasoned that this definition was expan-
sive enough to include the employer's credit program." 5
All of these types of programs are essentially terms linked to
compensation, whether they affect the amount an employee pays into
an insurance or retirement plan or the amount an employee may
ultimately take out. The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, in Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 8" made this link explicit,
stating that the terms of employment encompassed "all forms of mone-
tary and nonmonetary compensation which are integrally related to
[the employer's] wage structure."" As is obvious from a review of these
"easy cases," if an employer's action can be linked with an employment
practice specifically designated as proscribed under Title VI1," namely
discriminatory hiring, firing and compensation, a court is much more
likely to label the practice a "term, condition, or privilege" covered by
Title V11.89
Two cases involving situations in which law enforcement: agencies
required Spanish-speaking officers to speak Spanish on the job shed
1002 (1973); Bartmess v. I)rewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1971) (retirement
plan).
1.' 2 See, e.g., Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983).
83 707 E2d at 1277.
144 Id. at 1278 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a)).
s' Id.. at 1277-78. The particular regulation died in Keenan was developed 64r ,sex discrimi-
nation cases. The Keenan court, thereiOre, was also expanding the use of this regulation by
applying it to race discrimination, which it believed was in keeping with the broad nature ul the
terms. Irl. at 1278.
86 436 F. Sapp. 1184 (0. Md. 1977).
87 Id. at 1193 n.1 1.
8ATire link to adverse einj4loyment actions has also resulted in the courts holding certain
stereotyped attitudes actionable under Title VII as sex discrimination. See Hopkins, 109 S. Ci. at
1793; Radford, supra note 20, at. 516-17 & n.200, and cases cited therein.
" The term "condition" of employment is not only used in the Title VII context.. It. is also
used tinder the National Labor Relations Act to connote areas of the public sector employment
relationship that are subject to collective bargaining. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a) (14) (1994). In that.
context, courts have held that "[dile record must establish that there is a direct link between the
proposal and the work situation or employment relationship of the bargaining unit employees"
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light on how linking reindeer games to another employment action
might be useful in attacking reindeer games and their effects. In Perez
v. Federal Bureau of Investigation90 and Cota v. Tucson Police Depart-
ment,91 two district courts confronted policies requiring Spanish
speakers to use this skill on the job. In Perez, the plaintiffs were suc-
cessful, while in Cola, the plaintiffs were not successful. The two cases
can be distinguished: in Perez, the plaintiffs were able to link their
Spanish-speaking job duties to denial of promotions and benefits,
whereas the plaintiffs in Cota were not. 92
The plaintiffs in Cola tried to link the Spanish-speaking require-
ment to compensation, arguing that they experienced more stress on
the job due to speaking Spanish and also had to do more work for
which they did not get credit." Thus, the Spanish-speaking policy
required that they receive greater compensation." The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona held that the policy did not
"detrimentally affect the Spanish speakers, nor does it result in extra
work. Rather, it results in different work. Moreover, the Court finds that
such use is incidental to the job and is not a major component
thereof."95
 The link to compensation was tenuous at best. The ability
of an employee to link the particular employment practice to a "term,
condition, or privilege of employment" clearly recognized under Title
VII appears to be the key to a plaintiff's success in challenging more
novel "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
By way of contrast, in Perez, the plaintiffs attacked the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") practice of assigning arduous wiretap
duties to Hispanic agents because of their Spanish-speaking skills. The
in order for a practice to be considered a condition of employment subject to collective hargain-
ing. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 2094 v. Federal Labor Relations Anal., 833 F.2d
1037, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court distinguished private sector labor law, "which has permit-
ted negotiations over a variety of proposals for employees engaging in nonduty activity during
nonduty hours." Id. at 1045. In addition, private sector employers arc prohibited from discrimi-
nating against employees in "any term or condition of employment [so as] to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994). Employers arc
also required to bargain collectively regarding "terms and conditions of employment." Id.
§ 158(d). The terms in this context have been used to combat a wide array of employer conduct.
See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984) (addressing conduct leading to
intolerable working conditions); N.L.R.B. v. Bestway Trucking, Inc., 22 F.3d 177, 180-81 (7th Cir.
1994) (addressing discrimination in work assignments).
9°707 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
91 783 F. Supp. 458 (D. Ariz. 1992).
92 Id. at 463; Perm, 707 F. Supp. at 908.
"783 E Stipp. at 463.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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United States District Court for the Western District of Texas con-
cluded that the "evidence demonstrated that the practice of the [FBI]
is to place the weight of deplored assignments on Hispanic Special
Agents. Whereas Anglos are relieved from the requirement of using
their language skills and focus on other skills which would enhance
promotional prospects, the same opportunity is denied Hispanic
agents.'""' In addition, the court believed that the practice affected the
"conditions " of employment because the wiretap duties associated with
Spanish-speaking assignments required longer shifts, were involuntary,
often took agents off assigned cases, and resulted in periods away from
home and family."
The court linked these "conditions of employment" to promo-
tional opportunities, stating that the language skill "becomes sig-
nificant in relation to the duty assignments made to Spanish-speaking
Special Agents and the result of these assignments on promotional
opportunities."98 Specifically, because the Hispanic officers' cases were
reassigned, they did not have the opportunity to close cases and de-
velop informant contacts. This put them behind when it came time for
promotions."" While the agents did have letters of appreciation placed
in their employment files, the court held that this was not enough:
Testimony throughout trial demonstrated that small differ-
ences and nuances in subjective evaluations have great sig-
nificance for the true import of the evaluation. Discrimina-
tory animus is elusive; Title VII analysis focuses on the effects
of prohibited discrimination and permits this Court, upon
consideration of the entire record, to infer the cause.'""
The court noted another result of the Spanish-speaking assign-
ments: "Hispanic agents are not exposed to the managers who make
the subjective evaluations and determinations for career advance-
ments."'"' In addition, although Hispanic agents could technically
say "no" to such assignments, such a refusal would reflect badly on
•" Perez, 707 E Supp. at 908. Another distinction between the two cases is that in Perez, the
FBI also trained English speakers to speak Spanish, yet did not give them the same jobs as those
who were Hispanic Spanish speakers. Id. at 909. In Cotta, on the other hand, the requirement was
only imposed on those who came to the police department speaking Spanish. 783 E Supp. at
461.
97 Perez, 707 F. Supp. at 908.
gs
99 Id. at 910.
to-' Id.
tot Id.
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an agent and "transfers into evaluation whereby the agent is judged
`not aggressive,' or 'not dedicated." 102
The Spanish-speaking requirement had a similar effect to that of
reindeer games.'°3
 It prevented Hispanic employees from obtaining
experience necessary for promotional opportunities. It limited their
exposure to "the boss"—the supervisor who made promotion deci-
sions. In addition, the court recognized the effects of "small differences
and nuances in subjective evaluations" on promotional opportunities.
Finally the court noted the implications of saying "no." Refusal results
in the employer's questioning of the employee's dedication.
Reindeer games have a similar effect. Like the Spanish-speaking
requirement, they can limit less favored employees' opportunities for
exposure to the boss. Because of the frequently subjective nature of
upper level management decisions, what might be termed subtle dif-
ferences between employees brought about by exposure to the boss
through reindeer games will have an effect on promotional opportu-
nities. In addition, the Perez court noted the implications of saying "no"
to the boss. "No" often resulted in the employer's considering the
employee not to be a team player. Based on the above analysis, the
plaintiffs effectively linked the FBI's bilingual policy with promotions.
The linkage requirement is consistent with the reasoning of courts
that have held that a variety of different employer activities do not
violate Title VII. For example, the courts have held that differences in
grooming requirements between men and women are not action-
able. 1 °" Likewise, an employer's reputation for discrimination does not
state a claim.'''' In addition, a variety of other differences in treatment
based on race or sex have been attacked with limited success under
Title VII. For example, in O'Connor v. Peru State College, 1 U6 the plaintiff,
a female college basketball coach, alleged she was assigned a heavier
load of classes and outside duties than male coaches. 1 °7 In addition,
1 °2 Perez„ 707 E Supp. at 912.
"The Perez plaintiffs challenged the policies wider both disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories. Id. at 898. Sec .supra note 55 and infra notes 183 & 252 for a discussion of the
three primary 'nodes of proof under Title VII. The court upheld the disparate treatment claim
Rased on the Spanish speaking requirement. Id. at 909.
"Willingham v. Macon Tel. ruhrg Co., 352 F. Stipp. 1018, 1021 (M.D. Ga. 1972); Boyce v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Stipp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349
F. Stipp. 235, 237 (C.1). Cal. 1972); Raiford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 E Supp. 316,
317 (S.D. Fla. 1972). But see Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 E Supp. 661, 664 (C.D. Cal.
1972).
"EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 122. 463 E Supp. 388, 424-25 (D. Md. 1978).
106
 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986).
"Id. at 634.
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she alleged a disparity in recruiting and that she had to report absences
whereas males did not.mg The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
upheld the trial court's decision against the plaintiff, stating that her
duties were not inconsistent with those of male coaches. 1 °9 Blacklisting
an employee has also been held lawful under Title VII."° In all of these
cases, the plaintiffs did not make the necessary "link" to hiring, firing
or compensation.
C. Application to Reindeer Games
The implications for reindeer games in the linkage context is
obvious. It is apparent from Perez that if an employer policy or action
can be linked to more traditional terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, then that reindeer game can be used to bolster a plain-
tiff's case.'" In Perez, the Spanish-speaking requirement resulted in
some effects similar to reindeer games: Spanish speakers suffered in
employment opportunities (and specifically in promotions) from lim-
ited exposure to their supervisors. In addition, the court noted the
effect of saying "no" to the boss: the employee would not be considered
a "team player."
At least one court has made this link in the context of sex discrimi-
nation. In Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc.," 2 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland discussed what is meant by "terms
or conditions of employment" in a sex discrimination suit involving
allegations of reindeer games. The plaintiff's complaint made several
novel allegations, including, among other things, that all male sales-
persons were invited to a conference with their spouses, while the class
10" Id. at 635.
I" Id. at 635-36.
II" Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 443 F. Stipp. 1334,1339 (S.D.N.Y 1978).
"I Several early cases held reindeer games actionable in the context of "across the hoard"
class actions. In across the board cases, employees were permitted to attack virtually all employer
actions that were discriiMitatory in maitre. The Supreme Court signilicatnly limited such lawsuits
by requiring strict adherence to the class action requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Rule 2"). General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 197,156 (1982) (holding that.
individual litigant seeking to initiate Title VII class action must meet all requirements of Rule
23), Prior to that, reindeer games allegations often arose in such cases. See, e.g., Walker v. World
Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918,920 (8th Gin. 1977) (allegations included that company bought birthday
cakes for white employees, but not for African-American employees). For more on across the
board cases, see Griffin v. [Nigger, 823 F.2(11476,1489-87 (11th Cir. 1987) (going through history
of such litigation); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of Repre-
sentation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 Onto ST. L.J. 607
(1993); Marcy O'Brieti, Comment, Jenson v. Eyelet]] Taconite Co.; A Legal Standard for Class
Action Sexual Harassment, 19 J. Cold , . I... 417,421 -24 (1994).
112 430 F. Supp. 1184 (I). Md. 1977).
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of female salespersons were not."' In concluding that not all employer
actions constitute "terms and conditions of employment," the court
reasoned that:
[the term is] an amorphous phrase which takes on sig-
nificance only when placed in the context of a specific charge
of discrimination. Under the facts of this case, the expression
means all forms of monetary and nonmonetary compensa-
tion which are integrally related to Rubbermaid's wage struc-
ture. These would include, for example, the type of automo-
bile assigned to employees, limitations on familial travel at
company expense, or other nonrenumerative fringe benefits
such as the eligibility for bonus and incentive plans. While
"terms and conditions of employment" is a catch-all provision,
under no circumstances in this case could it be said to include
the range of employment policies plaintiff seeks to litigate." 4
Other courts have used reindeer games as evidence of discrimina-
tion in the compensation context. In EEOC v. Shelby County Govern-
ment,"' the plaintiffs used reindeer game allegations to bolster a pay
discrimination case."' The plaintiffs alleged that male employees of
the county clerk's office participated in the local bar picnic and golf
tournament, whereas female employees were not invited." 7 Male em-
ployees also were permitted to leave work early to referee sports events.
Finally, the boss, Mr. Blackwell, took male employees to lunch but did
not invite female employees."" The court attributed this conduct to
"thoughtless preservation of outdated custom, rather than to a con-
scious consideration of sex in determining conditions of employ-
ment." The court reasoned that "[b]ecause women have not tradi-
tionally refereed sports events, men who left early did receive a benefit
that female employees did not have. Yet it can hardly be said that any
female employee was denied an opportunity to leave early to referee
a sports event." 2" Using these practices to "lend credence" to allega-
tions of wage discrimination, 12 ' the court concluded:
" 3 1d. at 1187 n.2.
111 14. at 1193 n.11.
115 707 F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
111-1 Plaintiffs also challenged wage disparities. Id. at 979.
" 7 Id. at 985.
"8 1d. at 980. There was also testimony that men received raises when they married or had
a child, which reflects stereotyped notions of who is the primary wage-earner in a family. Id.
119 id. at 985.
12" Shelby, 707 F. Supp. at 985-86.
121 Id. at 979.
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[The] evidence taken together—statistics of salaries and raise
histories, the background and performance of employees,
Blackwell's own testimony about the reasons for his actions
and, to a lesser extent, proof about differing treatment of male
and female employees—strongly supports a conclusion that
the existing pay disparities would not have occurred in the
absence of consideration of sex.' 22
The subjective nature of Blackwell's determinations was helpful to
plaintiffs' case, with the court admitting that the subjective nature
of the decision making process allowed Blackwell's decision to be-
come infected with sex discriminatory criteria.'"
The logic of Hubbard and Shelby can be applied to reindeer games
that are employer-sponsored. For example, a round of golf or lunch
for which the employer picks up the tab (no doubt under the suppo-
sition that business discussions will take place) would affect compen-
sation under the Hubbard court's analysis and therefore be actionable
under Title VII, This would also apply to client entertaining opportu-
nities. For example, a supervisor's inclusion of subordinates in taking
a client to a play or some other social activity, which is paid for by the
employer, should implicate Title VII. The employer can receive a tax
deduction for such entertaining expenses, making them clearly "part
and parcel of the employment relationship."'" These forms of reindeer
games can be linked to compensation: an employee receives a good
lunch, a day of golf, or an evening at the opera courtesy of his em-
ployer. In addition, the employer often receives a benefit. For example,
increased sales from that client are attributable, in part, to the social
contact provided by the reindeer games.
Beyond mere compensation terms, however, the logic of Perez can
be extended to promotion situations. Certainly if a female employee
can show that she was not promoted while a similarly situated male,
who happened to play golf with the boss every Saturday, was promoted,
the reindeer game would constitute admissible evidence that could be
used to bolster the female employee's case of sex discrimination. Pat-
terns of such discrimination—e.g., a male boss takes only male employ-
ees to lunch—could support a case of systemic disparate treatment or
could be used to support an individual disparate treatment case under
122 Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
'" Id.
124 Hishon v. King Sc Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984); see I.R.C. § 274(a) (1988) (allowing
tax deduction to employer for entertainment activities directly related to or associated with active
conduct of employer's trade or business).
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appropriate circumstances. The more difficult problem arises when the
reindeer game is the only act of discrimination. Holding it actionable
under circumstances in which there is no obvious link to another
adverse employment action becomes a much trickier business.
D. Reindeer Games that Are Actionable Without the Link
While the Shelby court did not come right out and say it, it is clear
that it did not believe reindeer games to be all that important and not
likely, in and of themselves, to be actionable.' 2' Instead, the court found
them useful in showing a general predilection on the part of the
employer to discriminate. The United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico, in Selgas v. American. Airlines, Inc.,' 2  unlike the
Shelby court, made a firm statement about its position against such
activities. In Selgas, the plaintiff challenged a variety of employer prac-
tices, including her exclusion from company events where male em-
ployees were included.' 27 Some of these events included entertainment
functions for custotners. 128 This is a particularly heinous form of rein-
deer game, as it cuts off the employee from the real source of influence
in a company: its customers. The court used this as evidence of dis-
crimination, stating that the jury could have held that this was direct
evidence of discrimination. Rather than being merely circumstantial
evidence that bolsters a discrimination case, this reindeer game could
prove the case in and of itself. 12"
125 REOC v. Shelby County Gov't, 707 F. Supp. 969, 986 (IND. Tenn. 1988); see also Langston
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 1990 WI. 129567 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Langston claimed age discrimination
under the ADEA as well as national origin discrimination under Title VII. Langston argued that
the following discriminatory acts provided sufficient evidence of discrimination to withstand a
summary judgment motion: (1) she was not given training materials; (2) her work was reassigned
to younger employees; and (3) none of the managers went out to lunch with her, but they did
dine with others at her same level. Id. at '627. Despite plaintiffs linking the reindeer game—not
dining with managers—with other more traditional "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment," the court concluded that "Hone of this evidence, if believed, is enough to support a
finding of discrimination on the basis of age or national origin." Id, at '7. On the specific lunch
allegations, the court explained "passing on the question whether this involves the terms and
conditions of her employment, Langston has not pointed to any facts suggesting that this had
anything to du with her age or national origin." Id. at '8. On this basis, the court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id.
126 858 F. Supp. 316 (D.P.R. 1994).
127 Id. at 322. It. is not entirely clear what was the exact nature of these events from the facts
given in the case, but it appears that they did include client entertainment. Id. at 322 n.8. Plaintiff
also challenged discrimination in salary and in expense account. Id.
125 Id.
129 Id. There was also other evidence to lend credence to the direct evidence case. "For
example, there was testimony that during a company function, Kerr's [plaintiffs) supervisor told
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Aside from Selgas, there are few cases suggesting that reindeer
games, in and of themselves, are actionable as a term, condition or
privilege of employment. In Marcing .Fluor Daniel, Inc.,' the plaintiff
attacked a variety of distinctions made between her and male employ-
ees, among them being: (1) she was required to obtain a superior's
signature authorizing purchases; (2) she was removed from a distribu-
tion list and excluded from procurement staff meetings; (3) she was
required to keep a daily log in addition to her usual time sheets;' 3 ' and
(4) she was given typing duties that were not given to male employ-
ees.'"2 The United State District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that the testimony of plaintiff's superiors "manifested their
unexpressed but actual view of [plaintiff] as inferior because she was
a woman who had worked her way up from a clerical position: she was
not 'one of the boys' (either literally or figuratively)." Marring is one
of the few cases recognizing that "subtle" distinctions can make a
difference and, therefore, are actionable under Title VII. As the court
explained, "'adverse employment action' is not limited solely to loss or
reduction of pay or monetary benefits, but can also encompass other
forms of adversity, including subtle distinctions in the terms and con-
ditions of her employment."' 31
As a general matter, the majority of these cases more obviously
implicate terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The court's
reasoning in Selgas, however, shows some promise for the use of Title
VII to combat distinctions based on reindeer games.
III. REINDEER GAMES As HARASSMENT
A. The Development of Harassment Law
While reindeer games should constitute evidence of discrimina-
tion in "linkage" cases, simply linking reindeer games to the denial of
other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment does not help
employees who cannot yet make that link, but still feel left out, isolated,
her that she should go home and take care of her chikhren and that one of the American
[defendant] managers from Miami stated that certain functions where American's customers were
entertained were `male' events." Id.
131'826 F. Stipp, 1128 (N.D. III. 1993).
131 Id. at 1134.
132 Id. at 1135. Plaintiff also argued that there were distinctions made in assignments as well
as in salaries and benefits. Id. at 1134-35.
1 " Id. at 1135.
124 M. at 1140; see at5o Taub, supra note 5, at 418 (arguing that stereotypes should constitute
a per se violation or Title VII).
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and doomed to failure because of their "less favored" status. Without
the necessary linkage to another traditionally actionable term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment, a reindeer game will likely not be
held actionable without some sort of extension of Title VII to cover it.
The obvious place to turn is to the area of expansion that has spawned
the most notable discussion of what constitutes a term, condition, or
privilege of employment: cases involving racial and sexual harassment.
In an effort to expand Title VII jurisprudence to incorporate harass-
ment, several courts necessarily engaged in a discussion of what con-
stituted a term, condition, or privilege of employment for purposes of
Title VII. Based on the reasoning of these cases, which were also relied
upon by the court in Meritor in recognizing sexual harassment as
actionable, reindeer games should be actionable as a form of harass-
ment in appropriate cases.'"
In Rogers v. EEOC,P.'" Judge Goldberg' 37 of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit authored an opinion that became the
basis for expanding Title VII into the harassment area for many other
jurisdictions. 13" In that opinion, Judge Goldberg considered whether
an employer's policy of segregating optometry patients based on their
ethnic origins constituted a hostile environment for employees and
therefore violated Title VII.'" The lower court had determined that
this did not constitute an unlawful employment practice within the
meaning of Title VII. 140
 In concluding that the district court was wrong,
judge Goldberg noted "that the relationship between an employee and
his working environment is of such significance as to be entitled to
I 35 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 greatly expanded the relief available to a plaintiff in a sexual
harassment case. The Act makes compensatory and punitive damages available to the victims of
sexual harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1994); see 1 ALBA Corm:, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.21 (2c1 ed. 1994); Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: A Printer, 29 AKRON L. REV. 269, 273-74 (1996) (noting increase in
relief under 1991 Act).
136 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1971). ,
137 0rily one other circuit judge concurred in the result. Id.
13'3 See, e.g., Keenan v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 707 F.2d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 1983);
Bundy v..fackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City
of St. Louis, 549 E2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977); Haskins v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
811 F. Supp. 534, 537 (D. Or. 1992); Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend, 617 F.
Stipp. 1330, 1352 (N.D. hid. 1985); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 101 (noting that
Rogers was "the first reported appellate decision to address on-the-job harassment").
139 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237. There was some debate as to whether the claimant was complain-
ing about this practice or the practice of giving plaintiff patients of her own ethnic background,
in this case Hispanic. Justice Godbold interpreted the plaintiff's claim in this latter manner in
his concurring decision. See id. at 241.
t`10 Id. at 237 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 425 (F.D. Tex. 1970)).
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statutory protection.” 141 kidge Goldberg interpreted the "term, condi-
tion, or privilege". language to evince a broad congressional approach
to prohibited conduct:
This language evinces a Congressional intention to define
discrimination in the broadest possible terms. Congress chose
neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to
elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activi-
ties. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being uncon-
strictive, knowing that constant change is the order of our day
and that the seemingly reasonable practices of the present
can easily become the injustices of the morrow. Time was
when employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a
series of isolated and distinguishable events, manifesting it-
self, for example, in an employer's practices of hiring, firing,
and promoting. But today employment discrimination is a far
more complex and pervasive phenomenon, as the nuances
and subtleties of discriminatory employment practices are no
longer confined to bread and butter issues. As wages and
hours of employment take subordinate roles in management-
labor relationships, the modern employee makes ever-increas-
ing demands in the nature of intangible fringe benefits. Rec-
ognizing the importance of these benefits, we should neither
ignore their need for protection nor blind ourselves to their
potential misuse."'
Judge Goldberg also explained that courts must give Title VII a
liberal construction to effectuate Congress's purpose in enacting the
legislation: "to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humili-
ation" of discrimination. 143 Because of the broad nature of this congres-
sional mandate, he reasoned that both economic and psychological
aspects of employment are covered by the terms.'" Indeed, "the phrase
`terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' in Section 703 is an
141 Id. at 237-38.
142 Id. at 238.
143 Id. Judge Goldberg discussed these goals in terms of ethnic discrimination because that
was the type of discrimination with which he was confronted in the case. However, insolitr as Tide
VII also applies to sex and religious discrimination, it would seem that such forms of discrimina-
tion would be accorded the same treatment.. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 R2d 934, 944-45 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (relying on Rogers and essentially equating racial harassment with sexual harassment
for purposes of analysis). But see Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 Supp. 822, 834
n.21 (D. Md. 1994) (stating that racial harassment is not a "proper analogy" for sexual harassment
under Title VII).
144 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
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expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice
of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination." 1 h 5 Based on Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"" he deter-
mined that because a lack of intent by the employer does not immunize
an otherwise discriminatory employer practice, Title VII is concerned
with the consequences and effects of the employer's practices—not
simply the employer's motivations."' Under this reasoning, the em-
ployer's policy could violate Title VII, even though it was arguably
directed only at patients and not at employees, because the policy
could be construed as a "subtle scheme designed to create a working
environment imbued with discrimination and directed ultimately at
minority group employees." The acceptance of non-economic or
non-monetary "fringes" as actionable practices under Title VII has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. 149
In Henson v. Dundee,' 5° another case relied upon by the Supreme
Court in Meritor,' 51 the Eleventh Circuit became the second circuit
court to apply hostile environment law to harassment based on sex. 152
Relying in part on Judge Goldberg's decision,'" the court explained
that there need not be a tangible job detriment in order for an em-
ployment practice to be actionable.'" Equating sexual harassment with
racial harassment, the court stated that "[a] pattern of sexual harass-
ment inflicted upon an employee because of her sex is a pattern of
behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one sex
145 Id.
146
 40 1 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs represents the Supreme Court's expansion of Title VII claims
into disparate impact cases. Disparate impact requires no discriminatory intent on the part of
the employer. Rather, the employer policy need only have a disproportionate impact based on a
protected status.
147
 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 239.
118 Id.
149 1.1arris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
15°682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
151
 See Merilor, 477 U.S. at 67.
i 52 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first extended hostile environment
claims to discrimination based on sex, although the plaintiff's claim also contained a quid pro
quo element. Id. at 938. Prior to Bundy, courts did hold quid pro quo harassment to be actionable.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Train, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., Inc., 552
F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curia's).
153
	 682 F.2d at 901. The Eleventh Circuit was formerly part of the Fifth Circuit.
Therefbre, judge Goldberg's decision, being in the Fifth Circuit, would have some impact on the
Eleventh Circuit decision in Henson. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (II th
Cir. 1981).
154 Henson, 682 F.2d at 901.
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with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."'" The
court followed Rogers in determining that an employee's psychological
well-being is a term, condition or privilege of employment within the
meaning of Title VII.'" The court went on to explain that, in order to
be actionable, this harassment must be "sufficiently pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment." 157
In Keenan v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,'"the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit discussed what constitutes psycho-
logical harm that implicates a "term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment" for purposes of Tide VII. The court had to decide whether a
garnishment policy whereby employees were reprimanded for the first
and second garnishments of their salaries and were discharged for the
third garnishment had a disparate impact based on race.'" The issue
arose as to whether such a garnishment practice could be considered
a "term, condition, or privilege of employment" for purposes of Title
VII." In making this determination, the court reviewed both case law
and EEOC guidelines interpreting the provision. 16' Noting that Title
VII "protects an employee's psychological as well as economic well-be-
ing," the court stated that the reprimands themselves may so affect the
conditions of employment as to make them actionable under Title
VII.'" As the court explained:
Because Title VII protects an employee's psychological as well
as economic well-being, . . and because it is not necessary
for a protected employee to demonstrate a "tangible job det-
riment" ... to prove a violation of Title VII, a reprimand that
has a meaningful adverse effect on an employee's working
conditions may be prohibited. 1 "3
155 Id. at 902.
156 Id. at 904 (citing Rogers, 954 F.2d at 238).
157 Id.
I"707 F.2(1 1274 (11th Cir. 1983),
Id. at 1275.
16" Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1275-78. The courts have both ignored and relied upon the EEOC guidelines,
depending on whether they supported the courts' position or not. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1976) (level of deference given to EEOC guidelines depends on
numerous factors); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (EEOC guidelines
entitled to great deference).
152 Keenan, 707 F.2d at 1277.
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In addition, the court linked the reprimands to the possible denial
of credit, which it considered a term, condition, or privilege of
employment because of that employer's offering an "extensive
credit network" to its employees.'" Therefore, the reprimand could
constitute a denial of a "fringe benefit." 16'
In Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of both Judge Goldberg and the Henson
court in extending Title VII to hostile work environment claims of
sexual harassment,' 66 In Meritor, the Court explained that "[t] he phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congres-
sional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women' in employment."' 67 The Court relied on EEOC guide-
lines defining "sexual harassment" to include situations where "'such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. -168 The Court also relied upon Rogers,
and quoted its expansive language regarding actionable conduct un-
der Title VII.' 69 It quoted the following relevant section from the
Eleventh Circuit decision Henson v. Dundee. 17°
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive envi-
ronment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harass-
ment is to racial equality. Surely a requirement that a man or
woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets.' 71
Based on Rogers, Henson and the EEOC guidelines, the Court con-
cluded that non-economic sexual harassment in the form of a
hostile work environment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment" is actionable.' 72
164 Id. at 1277 & n.2.
165 /d. at 1277.
156 477 U.S. 57 (1985).
167 Id. at 64 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dept of Water and Power v. Marthart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Or, 1971)) ).
168 /d. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604,11(a) (3) (1996)).
169 1d. at 135-66.
in 682 F.2c1 897 (1101 Cir. 1982).
171 /11entar, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
172/d.
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The United States Supreme Court, in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.,' 73 reiterated this standard, explaining that it "takes a middle path
between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."'" Jus-
tice Ginsburg, in her concurrence, explained that the key issue in
analyzing a hostile work environment claim "is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employ-
ment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."'" Since
Monitor, many courts have echoed this language, stating that it is meant
to sweep in a broad range of employment practices. 17t' While the broad
language of Meritor has been the law for some nine years now, its
implications for expansion into the area of reindeer games have been
examined by few courts.
B. Gender Discrimination and Hostile Work Environments
The classic sexual harassment hostile work environment case in-
volves sexual innuendo or sexually explicit materials. Reindeer games
do not suggest the same sort of sexually-oriented motive. In this regard,
the courts and commentators have distinguished between hostile work
environment cases that involved sexual innuendo and those that in-
volved, what has been termed, "gender discrimination"--cases in
which an employee is simply treated poorly because of her sex.' 77 It is
not clear, at first, whether hostile environment cases should be ex-
tended to the latter variety of cases: those in which the plaintiff's were
subjected to mistreatment (though not of a sexually connotative na-
ture) because of their sex.'"
The Harris court's language addressing what constitutes action-
able conduct is broad. Unlike most employment practices that are
actionable under Title VII, hostile work environment harassment does
not require a tangible harm. Instead, the key issue is "whether mem-
178 14 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
174 Id. at 370.
17:'
	 at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
176 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1993); Marshall v.
Nelson Eke., 766 F. Supp. 1018, 1038 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
177
 See, e.g., Andrews v, City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir, 1990); Hall v. Gus
Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406,
1415 (10th Cir, 1987); Bell v, Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985);
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Gin 1985); Bilbrcy v. Werts Novelty Go., 88! F.
Supp. 370, 375 (S.D. Ind. 1994); see alsojoshua F. Thorpe, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile
Work Environment, 1990 DUKE Li. 1361, 1361-02 (1990).
178 See Thorpe„ supra note 177, at 1364-65 (arguing in favor of liability in such cases).
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hers of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposeci." 17"
Based in part on this language, the trend in the courts is to hold
that employer conduct need not have sexual overtones to be actionable
under Title VII. Instead, for example, "conduct of a nonsexual nature
that ridicules women or treats them as inferior can constitute prohib-
ited sexual harassment." As the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in McKinney v. Dole,' 81
 explained in one of the
earliest decisions to make the distinction between conduct involving
sexual overtones and other sexually harassing conduct:
We have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal
treatment of an employee or group of employees that occurs
because of the sex of the employee must, to be illegal under
Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other inci-
dents with clearly sexual overtones. And we decline to do so
now. Rather, we hold that any harassment or otherwise un-
equal treatment of an employee or group of employees that
would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees
may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal
condition of employment under Title VII. 182
While the court in McKinney discussed conduct that was of a
violent nature (the plaintiff's supervisor had grabbed and twisted her
arm), the logic used by the court applies equally to reindeer games.
Reindeer games are a source of unequal treatment of an employee,
and sometimes of whole groups of employees, that would not occur
but for the sex of the employee. It seems clear that the reasoning of
this case, as well as other cases recognizing conduct that is not sexual
in nature as harassing,' 83
 supports holding reindeer games actionable
as harassment if such games are sufficiently patterned or pervasive. For
179 Mirth, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
18°
 Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Stipp. 922, 929 (M.D. Ala. 1992); see also Stacks
v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1994); Kopp v. Samaritan
Health Sys., inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485; Hall, 842 F.2d at
1014; Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415; McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138-39 & nn.20-21; Rainey, 881 F. Stipp.
at 375; see also Thorpe, supra note 177, at 1364. At the time that article was written, there was
some debate regarding whether this type of harassment was actionable as gender discrimination.
Thorpe, supra note 177, at 1364-65. However, since then, the consensus among courts is that
such discrimination, even though lacking in sexual overtones, is actionable. See 58 Fed. Reg.
51,267 n.2 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1,609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993)
L 81
 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
182 Id. at 1138 (footnote omitted).
1" See supra note 177 and accompanying text,
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example, if they occur on a frequent basis—e.g., the boss takes all the
men out for lunch on Fridays but leaves all the women behind—the
reindeer games should be actionable as harassment. In addition, if the
harassment, although only occurring once, is sufficiently severe, it
likewise would be actionable.
One recent case made use of reindeer games in just such a con-
text. In Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., the Supreme Court of Tennessee
decided whether "cold-shoulder" treatment that is not overtly based on
race or sex is actionable as harassment under the Tennessee Human
Rights • Act and/or Title VII.'" The plaintiff, Brenda Campbell, an
African-American female, complained to her employer of both racial
and sexual harassment on the job.' 85
 Her employer, Florida Steel, took
measures that ended the harassment. However, that did not stop Camp-
bell's fellow employees from giving her the "cold-shoulder treat-
ment"' ""
 as a result of her complaints. Campbell alleged that "her fellow
employees would ignore her completely, shun her, and prevent her
from sitting down in the lunch and break areas."' 87 Campbell informed
her supervisor of this conduct, although she would not name the
particular employees involved.'" Two weeks after the initial harass-
ment, Campbell resigned.' 8"
The trial court reasoned that this cold shoulder treatment resulted
in Campbell's constructive discharge.m The district court reversed,
holding that neither law "require [d] employers 'to ensure a pleasant
social environment.'"' 9 ' The district court reasoned that because the
cold-shoulder treatment was not related to race or sex, Florida Steel
was under no obligation to eliminate 4. 192
 The Court of Appeals re-
versed on this issue. The court held that conduct need not be "sexual
in nature" to constitute sexual harassment.'" However, it still held
against Campbell. It reasoned that Florida Steel did all it could to
eliminate the hostile environment, given that Campbell refused to
184
 Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). The Court used the same
standard to assess the claim under both acts. hi. at 31.
1115 a at 28.
]86
187 1d. at 29.
1811 Id. at 30. She also alleged that co-workers made comments such as "shit, here comes the
snitch" as she approached. Because she did not inform her supervisor of such treatment, the trial
court held that Florida Steel had no knowledge of such actions by her co-workers. hi,
189 Campbell, 919 S.W.2d at 30.
199 id. at 28.
1 91 Id. at 30.
192 Id.
1"	 at 32.
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identify the harassers.'" While Campbell ultimately lost because she
would not name her harassers, this case suggests that co-worker shun-
ning could form a basis for a sexual harassment claim even though it
did not involve "sexual" conduct.
C. Application to Reindeer Games
Harassment law is useful in making reindeer games that are not
easily linked with the usual terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment (i.e., compensation and promotion) actionable. Further, it can
be used to attack co-worker discrimination. While the paradigm case
of reindeer games involves supervisor actions, reindeer games have a
significant psychological effect when an employee is singled out for
exclusion by co-workers because of, for example, her sex. 196 While few
courts have addressed this type of harassment in the co-worker context,
those that have done so have opened up the possibility for expansion
of Title VII into this form of reindeer game.
Once again, a case involving bilingual workers sheds light on how
harassment might apply to reindeer games. In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
bilingual workers were required to speak English on the job.' 96 Pro-
ceeding under a disparate impact model, 197
 plaintiffs alleged that the
ability to make small talk on the job was a privilege of employment,
the denial of which was actionable under Title VII based on three
arguments: (1) the employer's policy denied them the ability to express
their cultural heritage on the job; (2) it denied them a privilege of
employment enjoyed by monolingual speakers of English; and (3) it
created an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation. 19" The
challenge to the English-only policy definitely implicates, although not
194 Campbell, 919 S.W.2d at 33. The Court did note that Campbell was faced with a "'Hobsons'
choice—identify the offenders, be labeled a snitch and suffer the consequences, or refuse to
identify them, making it impossible for the company to alleviate the problem, and continue to
suffer." Id. Unferumately, the Court determined that Campbell should suffer the brunt of this
choice—not her employer.
195 This could also be used in a racial harassment context.
196 998 F.2d 1480,1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
197 There are three general types of proof recognized under Title VII: (1) individual disparate
treatment; (2) systemic disparate treatment; and (3) disparate impact. First recognized by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), disparate impact is different
from the other two in that it requires no intent to discriminate on the part of the employer in
order for the employer to be held liable liar its actions. Instead, the plaintiff need only show that
the employer's actions have a disparate impact based on one of the criteria protected under Title
VII. While disparate impact is easiest to apply to objective employer Criteria, e.g., tests, degree
requirements, etc., the Supreme Court has held that it applies to subjective employer practices
as well. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,990-91 (1988).
198 Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1486-87.
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directly, harassment law concerned, as the plaintiffs were, with an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation.
While, in Garcia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit court noted the broad nature of the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" falling within Title VII's protection, it
held that the monolingual policy of the employer in that case was not
actionable. In doing so, the court reasoned that "` Where is no dispa-
rate impact' with respect to a privilege of employment `if the rule is
one that the affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance
is a matter of individual preference." 99 In addition, the court did not
believe the policy had a significant enough impact to be actionable
under Title VII because bilingual speakers were still free to converse
in English on the job. 2" Because "Title VII protects against only those
policies that have a significant impact," the English-only policy did not
affect a "term, condition, or privilege of employment."20 ' The court
likewise held that the English-only policy did not create an abusive
atmosphere that would be actionable under the reasoning of Meritor
v. Vinson. 202 Nonetheless,
[The court did] not foreclose the prospect that in some
circumstances English-only rules can exacerbate existing ten-
sions, or, when combined with other discriminatory behavior,
contribute to the overall environment of discrimination. Like-
wise, we can envision a case in which such rules are enforced
in such a draconian manner that the enforcement itself
amounts to harassment. In evaluating such a claim, however,
a court must look to the totality of the circumstances in the
particular factual context in which the claim arises.'"
While the Garcia court did not find the English-only policy action-
able as harassment, it left the door open for a harassment claim
under the right fact pattern.
An example of what might constitute the right fact pattern for a
harassment claim has been suggested in other contexts. In Firefighters
' 00 Id. at 1487 (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (51h Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 999
U.S. 1113 (1981)).
206 Id. at 1488. The court explained that one worker who spoke only Spanish was not bothered
by the English-only policy. ld.
°' Id.
202 1d. at 1489.
2°3 Garda, 998 F.2d at 1489. The court also rejected the EEOC guideline that provided that
such policies were actionable, Id.
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Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis,'" the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the informal
exclusion of African-American firefighters from "supper clubs" created
by the firefighters themselves could be considered a term, condition,
or privilege of employment covered by Title VII. These clubs were not
organized or regulated by the fire department. 205 In spite of this, the
court still held that discrimination in club membership could be ac-
tionable under Title VII. The trial court had concluded that, although
the exclusion of African-Americans was offensive, because no fire de-
partment. order promoted the discrimination, it was not actionable.'"
Quoting from Rogers, the court relied on Judge Goldberg's interpreta-
tion of Title VII as including employment conditions that affect an
employee's psychological well-being in ordering the district court to
supervise the fire department's promulgation of regulations that would
eliminate supper club segregation. 207
 The court did note that the city
provided the cooking facilities and that city officials were aware of the
segregated eating arrangements.'" However, it is unclear what role this
relationship to the city played in the court's opinion.
Likewise, in Berkman v. City of New York, 209 before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, a group of women
firefighters also challenged exclusion from firehouse communal activi-
ties. 210
 The plaintiffs were given the "silent treatment," whereby their
fellow firefighters refused to answer their questions about the job,
refused to dine with them and refused to discuss each others' perform-
ances on the job.'" They challenged these actions in the context of
retaliation, as both named plaintiffs were allegedly terminated in re-
taliation for complaints regarding sexism on the job. They successfully
used the reindeer games as evidence of that retaliation. 212
In a reported decision by the EEOC's Office of Federal Opera-
tions,213
 the EEOC held a form of reindeer games not actionable as
2°1 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977).
255 Id. at 514.
205 Id.
217 1d. at 515.
208 Id.
580 F. Stipp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
21 " Id. at 232.
'211 Id. at 239 n.16.
212 The named plaintiffs also complained of sexually harassing incidents, including crude
graffiti, sexual comments, and sexually-oriented pranks. Id. at 231.
213 The Office of Federal Operations, on behalf of the EEOC, reviews allegations of discrimi-
nation within the federal government. 29 C.F.R. §,§ 1614.401-405.
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harassment. 211 The claimant alleged, among other things, that her
supervisor failed to engage her in conversation based on her race
(white), color (white), religion (Catholic) and sex (female).2 ' 5 In ad-
dition to this allegation, the claimant stated that she was denied over-
time, denied annual leave, and was not permitted to eat in the same
places as other co-workers. 21" The reindeer games allegations were
limited to one incident: on one clay in particular, the claimant's super-
visor and a co-worker engaged in conversation, while the supervisor
did not do the same with the claimant:2 ' 7 The EEOC considered this
incident along with the claimant's allegation that on several dates she
was forced to work in what she termed "unhealthy working conditions"
(near an employee with poor personal hygiene). The EEOC stated that
for purposes of the regulations applicable to public employees, the
term "aggrieved employee" was one "who suffers a present harm or
loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for
which there is a remedy." 218 The court emphasized that the claimant
had to show "'direct, personal deprivation at the hands of the em-
ployer,' that is, a present and unresolved harm or loss affecting a term,
condition or privilege of his/her employment." 2 t" The claimant had
not shown how she was harmed by these incidents. 22"
The claimant, apparently in an effort to get around this "harm"
requirement, argued that these allegations constituted actionable liar-
assment. 22 ' The EEOC considered the conversation incident as well as
the claimant's exposure to unhealthy working conditions as potential
instances of harassment. 222 Consistent with Merilor v. Vinson., the EEOC
explained that the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create a hostile or abusive working environment. 223
This environment is judged by both a subjective and objective
standard. It must be hostile or abusive to both the victim herself as well
as to a reasonable person.224 In this regard, the EEOC noted that
"unless the conduct is very severe, a single incident or group of isolated
214 Riley v. Runyon, No. 01943960, 1995 WI.. 406074 (EEOC July 3, 1995).
215 Id. at *1.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at *2 (citing Diaz v. Deit't of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21,
1994)).
219 Riley, 1995 WL 406074, at '2 (quoting Diaz, EEOC Request No. 05931049).
220 ird
22] Id.
222 Id.
22.5
224 Riley, 1995 WI, 4116074, at *2.
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incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment." 225 The
EEOC found that the claimant had not alleged sufficient facts to
constitute a discriminatory working environment under these stand-
ards. 226
 In this regard, the EEOC held that the overtime and leave
allegations were "distinct" from the instances of alleged harassment. 227
Standing alone, the incidents involving conversations and lunches
were "isolated incidents which are not sufficiently severe so as to be
regarded as discriminatory harassment. "228
While these cases do not show a distinct fact pattern for holding
reindeer games actionable, they do give some indication of the level
of activity necessary in order to hold them actionable as harassment.
If the practice is sufficiently pervasive, i.e., women are consistently and
openly left out, it could be actionable, like the firefighters' refusal to
dine with their colleagues. A single incident likely would be in-
sufficient,229
 but if an employer excluded all women from a significant
event, i.e., a weekend retreat with the biggest client or customer, it still
might be actionable. Certainly, harassment law provides a way to ap-
proach such co-worker activities. However, there are additional prob-
lems related to employer liability for harassing behavior.
D. Agency Implications of Sexual Harassment Liability
Holding employers liable for the actions of employees becomes a
problem when the discrimination is not directly linked to some other
employment-related action (i.e., quid pro quo),"° but instead is based
on a hostile work environment. There are two distinct agency problems
in hostile work environment cases: determining when an employer is
liable for harassment by a supervisor and when an employer is liable
for harassment by a co-worker. Both forms of harassment, as described
above, could occur through reindeer games. While the hypotheticals
thus far posed have focused more on supervisor conduct, it is clear
that co-workers could just as easily shun a fellow worker with resulting
225 ltd. (quoting Diaz, EEOC Request No. 05931049).
226 Id, at *3,
127 7d. (quoting Diaz, EEOC Request No. 05931049).
2281d. (quoting Diaz, EEOC Request No. 05931049),
221/
 This is consistent with harassment law as it has developed. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo's Italian
Foods, 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Casual or isolated manifestations of discriminatory
conduct, such as a few comments or slurs, may not support a cause of action."); Barber v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 778 F.2d 750, 761 (11th Cir. 1985) ("mere utterance" in-
sufficient to carry burden of proof under Title VII); Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147,
152 (6th Cir. 1985) (occasional or sporadic slurs do not violate Title VII).
2" See, e.g., Goldsmith v. City of Attnore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162 (1 1 th Cir. 1993) (liability for
retaliation by supervisor mayor linked to transfer of complaining employee); see also Rachel E.
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psychological damage to that worker." 3 t Holding both the supervisor
and, to a lesser extent, co-workers liable for hostile work environment
harassment poses difficult questions of agency that must be discussed
in order to determine whether there is a practical way of holding
reindeer games actionable as harassment under current Title VII law.232
In Meritor v. Vinson, the United States Supreme Court discussed
how to approach employer liability in the harassment context. Unfor-
tunately, the Court did not come up with a definite rule for the courts
and potential litigants to follow. Instead, the Court set up general
parameters of employer liability and adopted general agency principles
(which it did not describe in detail) as a guide for determining em-
ployer liability. Confronted with a trial court that had held that an
employer must have actual notice of the supervisor's misconduct in
order to be held liable and an appellate court that held the employer
to a strict liability standard for the actions of its supervisors, the Court
took a vague middle-of-the-road position.233 Acknowledging that com-
mon law agency principles might not be transferable to harassment law
wholesale, the Court concluded that Congress intended the courts to
look to agency principles for "guidance in this area." 234 For this reason,
the Court rejected both the trial court and court of appeals' views of
the case, specifically, that an employer is automatically liable for har-
assment by its supervisors and the employer is not liable absent actual
notice. 235 Further, the existence of a sexual harassment policy, whereby
Lutner, !Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat
Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 594, 601-02 & n.7 (1993) (describing and citing cases that
apply strict liability to quid pro quo harassment cases); Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 119
(noting that courts have adopted strict liability for quid pro quo harassment by supervisors);
Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look
at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 44 VAND. L. Rev. 1229, 1234 n.30 (1991) (citing cases
applying strict liability to quid pro quo cases).
231 See, e.g., Campbell, 919 S,W.2t1 '26.
232 A thorough discussion of the issue of agency in the hostile work environment context is
beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of reindeer pines, it is enough that there is a
possibility of holding an employer liable for them as a form of harassment. For a more detailed
discussion of the agency principles underlying sexual harassment law and die confusion they have
spawned, see Lutner, supra note 230, at 589; Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 59; Phillips, ,supra
note '230, at 1246-55; Glen A. Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding Employer
Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1057, 1062
(1995); N. James Turner, Employer Liability for Acts of Sexual Harassment in the. Workplace:
Re,spondeat Superior and Beyond, 68 FLA. R.J. 41, 42 (1994); J. Houk Verkerke, Notice Liability in
Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 282 (1995).
233 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70, 72.
234 Id. at 72. The use of agency principles in the sexual harassment context has been criticized
by various commentators. See, e.g., Lutner, supra note 230, at 589; Phillips, supra note 230, at
1255-56; contra Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 41; Staszewski, supra note 232, at 1096-104,
235 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
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an employee can complain about such harassment, does not always
insulate the employer from liability even if the employee chooses not
to invoke the policy. 2" The procedure in place must be effective to
remedy the harassment; otherwise, it will not insulate the employer. 237
The EEOC has interpreted Meritor as requiring an examination of
whether the harassing employee was acting in a "supervisory or agency
capacity." 238
With these general guidelines in place, the lower courts have
reached a consensus on employer liability for co-worker harassment 239
and issued a variety of rulings applying principles of agency to cases
involving harassment by supervisors.240
 In cases of co-worker harass-
ment, courts have held employers liable if they knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take effective remedial meas-
ures. 2.11
The standard for supervisors has caused much greater contro-
versy. Some courts seemingly have held employers either to a strict
liability standard, or to what comes close to a strict liability standard,
for the acts of its supervisors. 242
 Several of these courts reasoned that
if the supervisor/harasser is aided in harassing the plaintiff by the
236 M. at 72-73.
237 Id. at 73. In Meritor, the employer's policy required the plaintiff to report the harassment
to her supervisor, who was also her harasser. Obviously, such a policy is not an effective means
for that employee to use to eliminate harassment. See also Anne C. Levy, The Change in Employer
Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment After Meritor: Much Ado About Nothing, 42 ARK. L. Ray.
795, 823 (1989); Phillips, supra note 230, at 1235 -37 (discussing Meritor holding); Brian I'.
Conway, Note, A View Against Stria Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexually Offensive Work
Environments Created by Supervisory Personnel: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 91 DICK. L. REv.
1157, 1175 (1987).
239 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(c) (1996); see also Staszewski, supra note 232, at 1071-98 (arguing for
strict application of principles enunciated in RESTATEMENT OE AGENCY § 219 (1958)).
235 Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 103-06 (describing cases of co-worker harassment);
Phillips, supra note 230, at 1235 & n.34, 1237 n.50 (noting that this standard has been consistent
since before Meritor).
240
 For a discussion of agency principles as applied by the courts to sexual harassment cases
immediately billowing Meritor, sec Ulmer, supra note 230, at 598-602. Commentators have
argued for a variety of standards, and there remains great controversy regarding imputing liability
to employers. See Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 79, 131; Phillips, supra note 230, at 1250-57.
241 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(d) (1996); see supra note 229, and accompanying text.
242 V.:Alibi/II] v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.5c1 773, 780 (2d Cir.) (issue of fact existed as to whether
supervisor abused his delegated authority to create abusive and discriminatory work environ-
ment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994); Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747,
751-52 (3d Cir. 1990) (actions of supervisory employees imputed to operators of restaurant tinder
agency principles); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988)
(finding employer strictly liable for hostile environment harassment if harasser had actual or
apparent ;tulhority to alter plaintiff's employment status); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
830 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1987) (supervisor used employer-vested authority to lire
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existence of an agency relationship, the employer can be held liable. 243
These courts, however, have given employers another way out. If the
employer has a complaint system in place, it likely will he able to avoid
liability by adequately addressing the alleged harassment. 241
 This results
in the plaintiffs' having to prove direct liability in spite of the ostensible
strict liability standard."'
Other courts emphasize whether the supervisor's harassment took
place within the course and scope of employment."' These courts
consider where the harassment has occurred, i.e., in or out of the
office, as part of the key to holding the employer liable Jim- the acts of
the supervisor. Under the analysis of these courts, the employer should
foresee such harassment on the job. 247 This test is based on principles
of respondeat superior, 2 " 8 although courts have used respondeat supe-
rior to support a variety of tests applicable to employer liability under
Title 'VII. 2 '19
 Like courts purporting to apply a more "strict liability"
employees and to harass plaintiff, making agency relationship instrumental in harassment); Yates
v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 650, 636 (6th Cir. 1987) (employer could be held liable for supervisor's
conduct because it put supervisor in position of authority and therelisre harassment was foresee-
able); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1319-1320 (D. Kan. 1993) (under Title IX, director
aided in accomplishing harassment by agency relationship with school); Sims v. Montgomery
County COMIICII, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1069 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (several harassing police officers had
sufficient authority to be considered agents for purposes of Title VII liability). The standard for
sexual harassment is different than that used fOr racial harassment in that most courts agree that
employers are strictly liable racial harassment. by a supervisor. Lathier, ,supra note 280, at 618.
243 See, e.g., Karibian, 14 F.3c1 at 780; Iluddleston, 845 F.2d at 904; Spades, 830 F.2d at 1558;
Hastings, 842 F. Supp. at 1319, 1320; Sims, 766 F. Supp. at 1069; see also Rauh v. Coyne, 744 F.
Supp. 1186, 1190 (1).1).C. 1990) (motion to dismiss denied in part because supervisor was aided
in abuse by agency relationship).
244 Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 132-36 (arguing that this results in employees' having to
prove both direct and vicarious liability).
243 Id. at 132; Verkerke, supra note 232, at 277.
246 See, e.g.. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 185; Yates, 819 F.2d at 636; StaffOrd v. State, 835 F. Stipp.
1136, 1150 (WO. Mo. 1993). But we Guess, 913 F.2d at 465 (respondeat superior does not apply
to sexual harassment because it results in strict liability contrary to Meritor).
247 See, e.g., Yates, 819 F.2d at 636; Stafford, 835 F. Supp. at 1150; Shrout. v. Black Clawson Co.,
689 F. Supp. 774, 781 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
248 See REsTATEmENT (SEcoNn) OF AGE.Nicv § 219(1) (1958) (stating principle of respondeat
superior as master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting
in the scope of their employment"). Commentators have also argued that it does not fit well
within the sexual harassment liability scheme because most employers prohibit. harassment on
the job. On this basis, harassment could never be within the course and scope of employment.
for purposes of liability, See, e.g., Spanks, 830 F.2d at 1558-59; see also Littler, supra note 23(1, at
606-07; Phillips, supra note 230, at 1245.
249 See Luther, supra note 230, at 606-07 & n.143; Phillips, supra note 230, at 1245-46 & n.97;
Verkerke, supra note 232, at 286 11.33 (observing that courts apply respondeat superior incor-
rectly) .
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standard, these courts generally absolve an employer who takes appro-
priate corrective action. 25°
Other courts overtly hold that, to impose liability on the employer,
the employer either had to have actual knowledge of the harassment
or should have known about it.25 ' Of these courts, several have rea-
soned that if an employer places an employee in a position of authority
and that supervisor harasses an employee on the job, the employer is
liable because it was foreseeable that the harassment would occur. 252
Other courts have looked at the context of the harassment to deter-
mine whether the harassment was so pervasive that the employer
essentially had constructive knowledge of it. 253 Finally, in spite of Meri-
tor, some courts still hold plaintiffs to an actual knowledge standard,
i.e., they will not hold the employer liable absent actual knowledge of
the harassment by a supervisor. 254 At least one commentator has argued
that the existence of an effective complaint system results in an actual
knowledge in many jurisdictions. 255
 This commentator has argued in
favor of strict liability on the part of employers for the acts of their
supervisors. 256
250 See Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 131-36.
251 Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1992);
Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1991) (union had actual and
constructive notice of pervasively hostile environment); Hirschfield v. New Mexico Corrections
Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990); Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1345-46
(10th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (atmosphere
so seriously tainted that employer knew or should have known about it); Sparks v. Regional Med.
Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp, 735, 744 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (hostile work environment harassment requires
that employer knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take remedial action);
Marshall v. Nelson Elec., 766 F. Supp. 1018, 1040-41 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (employer liable only if
it knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take remedial measures); Rauh, 744
F. Supp. at 1189-90 (allegations in complaint provided basis for finding defendant had reason
to know of harassment); see also Phillips, supra note 230, at 1237-38 (noting that this is the
predominant view).
252 See, e. g. Yates, 819 F.2d at 636; Stafford, 835 F. Supp. at 1150.
253 Woods, 925 F.2d at 1202; Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515; Laughinghouse v. Risser, 754
F. Supp. 836, 840-41 (D, Kan. 1990).
254 See, e.g., Carrerro v. New York City Hous. Auth., 668 F. Stipp. 196, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
The validity of this decision is called into question by later Second Circuit decisions. See, e.g.,
Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying "knew
or should have known" test to harassment by both supervisors and co-workers). In addition, where
an employer has an effective complaint system in place, the employee is required to give the
employer notice of the alleged harassment; otherwise, the employer may be absolved of respon-
sibility for the supervisor's actions. Oppenheimer, .supra note 62, at 132-36.
255 Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 132-36; see also Verkerke, supra note 232, at 282-83
(noting that most circuits apply actual notice standard for supervisor harassment).
256 0ppenheimer, supra note 62, at 132-36.
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While these cases provide unclear guidance on the agency stand-
ard applicable to sexual harassment claims involving supervisors, 257 it
is clear that reindeer garnes, in the appropriate case, could provide a
basis for employer liability under principles currently being applied by
the courts. For those courts adopting a strict liability standard, agency
principles will pose no difficulty to plaintiffs attempting to hold em-
ployers liable for reindeer games-related harassment, so long as the
reindeer games are sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to a
hostile work environment. At the least, these courts require the em-
ployer to remedy the alleged harassing situation effectively. Even if the
Supreme Court ultimately adopts a "knew or should have known"
standard for both supervisor and co-worker harassment, reindeer
games could still be held actionable as harassment. For example, if the
supervisor takes male employees out to lunch on a consistent basis, but
leaves out the female employees, the employer would know (or at least,
it should know) about the hostile or offensive conduct. The lunch
group, for example, might gather in a common area, i.e., the reception
area of the business. Alternately, the employer likely possesses records
of off-site lunches for purposes of reimbursement or tax deductions.
In any case, if the conduct is sufficiently pervasive for employees to
become aware of it, it is likely open enough for the employer to be
aware of it. if the female employees complain about being left out, the
employer will have actual knowledge. If this conduct was coupled with
other instances of hostility, such as derogatory comments, women
being given less favorable assignments, etc., it would become easier to
make out a claim based on a hostile work environment.
E. Associational Rights.
 or "I Want to Golf with My Friends"
Part of the problem with addressing reindeer games in a Title VII
context is that, at some level, it would allow the courts to intrude on
personal relationships. Individuals should be able to choose their
friends, in and out of the office, without interference by the federal
government. Isn't the concept of reindeer games just a bit too intrusive
into our private lives? Further, isn't this an attempt to regulate what
amounts to at most a very minor form of discrimination? Indeed, the
courts have been reluctant to extend Title VII to what they consider
more trivial cases. For example, the courts have held that isolated
incidents of sexist or racist comments do not give rise to a claim of
257 See Phillips, Su/r note 230, at 1239-40.
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discrimination.258
 It is possible to classify reindeer games as such inci-
dental forms of discrimination and, further, to argue it is simply im-
possible to stop people from socializing outside of the office with
whomever they please. Such court intervention into private lives impli-
cates associational rights.
The issue of associational rights in the context of anti-discrimina-
tion legislation has already been addressed by the Supreme Court. In
Roberts u United States jaycees, 259
 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which forbade discrimination
on the basis of sex in "places of public accommodation," did not violate
the constitutionally protected freedom of association. 2"° In Roberts, the
Court discussed two types of constitutionally protected "freedom of
association." The first concerns "choices to enter into and maintain
certain intimate human relationships," mostly those involving the crea-
tion and sustenance of family—marriage, childbirth, raising and edu-
cating children and cohabitation with relatives. 26 ' The second involves
the right to associate for the "purpose of engaging in those activities
protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. "262 Reindeer games
arguably could involve either of these relations.
Friendships can be analogized to familial relationships. Friend-
ships are personal relationships from which individuals obtain per-
sonal enjoyment. Prohibiting, for example, a supervisor from inviting
a subordinate whom he likes to dinner at his home amounts to the
courts or Congress dictating with whom that supervisor can be friends.
However, the Court in Roberts drew a distinction between familial
relations and those involving employees. As the Court explained, "the
Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to
control the selection of one's spouse that would not. apply to regula-
tions affecting the choice of one's fellow employees." 218 To the extent
that reindeer games affect an employee's ability to succeed by in-
creased exposure to supervisory employees, it should fall squarely
within Roberts. A problematic situation arises where employees gather
265 Henson v. City or Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), reri. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), in sexual harassment case);
Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (race); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Stipp. 261, 269 (N.D. Tex.
1987) (citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238, in sexual harassment context).
2" 468 U.S. 609 (1981).
26° Id. at 623.
261 Id. at 617-19.
262 Id. at 618.
259 Id. at 620.
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together after work for purely social purposes and no supervisor is
involved. It is difficult to see how an employer can be held liable for
such individual choices, even though they might likely have the same
ostracizing effect as reindeer games.
While the Court has recognized the freedom to associate in famil-
ial relationships,'" it has not extended this analysis directly to friend-
ships. In the context of reindeer games, if a supervisor invites a subor-
dinate to a purely social gathering, having no obvious work-related
implications, should this still implicate Title VII liability? Even though
no work may be discussed and no clients may be present, the subordi-
nate is gaining an advantage over his co-workers by this casual exposure
to the boss. This relationship could be characterized as more like
friendship than a supervisor/subordinate relationship. This is a more
difficult situation from both an intuitive and associational rights stand-
point; yet, it is not clear under current Supreme Court precedent that
this would be protected by the First Amendment.
In City of Dallas v. Stanglin:'" 5 the Court expressly stated that "we
do not think the Constitution recognizes a generalized right of 'social
association."26" The context of the Court's decision in Stanglin is,
perhaps, a less compelling case for finding associational rights impli-
cated. In Stanglin, the owner of a teenage dance hall challenged a
Dallas ordinance that restricted the admission to his dance hall to
persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. 2"7 The owner
claimed, among other things, that this violated the associational rights
of these teens by limiting their interaction with persons outside this
age group. 21'8 In distinguishing this case from its earlier decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut:26" the Court stated that although the right to
associate does include "social" situations, this simply means that the
"right of expressive association extends to groups organized to engage
in speech that does not pertain directly to politics." 270
While Stanglin appears to limit the types of purely social relation-
ships that are covered by the freedom to associate, other courts have
extended protection to relationships that appear more social. The
leading example of this is the pre -Roberts case, Wilson v. Taylor.271 In
26.1 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-19.
'21 '5 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
'214
 Id. at 25.
267 Id. at 29.
2 ''H Id. at 24.
"381 U.S. 479 (1965).
270
 Roberts, 490 U.S. al 25.
271 733 1 7.2(1 1539 (Elth Cir. 1984).
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Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether firing a police officer
for dating the daughter of a reputed organized crime figure violated
the officer's associational rights. 272
 The court had to "determine
whether dating is a type of association protected by the First Amend-
ment's freedom of association."27
 Relying in part on the Fifth Circuit
decision in Sawyer v. Sandstrom274 and the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York decision in McKenna v. Peekskill
Housing Authority,275
 the court held that "the First Amendment free-
dom of association applies not only to situations where an advancing
of common beliefs occurs, but also to purely social and personal
associations."27" While dating is a much more intimate relationship
than merely being social friends, it would not take too much of an
extension of Wilson to encompass either the boss inviting a subordinate
to a clearly social event unrelated to work or a group of co-workers
gathering outside the office for a party or other purely social gathering.
In the context of employment discrimination, the second type of
"associational rights" analysis was addressed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Hishon v. King & Spalding 277 In Hishon, the law firm
of King & Spalding argued that the application of Title VII to law firm
partnership decisions would infringe on the firm's partners' constitu-
tional rights of expression and association. 278 The Court reasoned that
"[a]it:hough we have recognized that the activities of lawyers may make
a `distinctive contribution . to the ideas and beliefs of our society,'
respondent has not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function
would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider petitioner for
272 Id. at 1540-41.
273 Id. at 1543.
274
 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980). The court in Sawyer held that an overly-broad loitering
ordinance violated the right to freedom of association. The court reasoned that the only illegal
act was the association with certain individuals who possessed illegal drugs. Id. at 316. The Wilson
court characterized this case as "teach [Mg) that one's first amendment right to associate encom-
passes the right to simply meet with others." Wilson, 733 F.2d at 1543. Given the language and
the holding of the Supreme Court in Slonglin, it is unclear whether the freedom to associate
currently reaches so far. See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24 ("It is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street
or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall—hut such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the
activity within the protection of the First Amendment.").
276
 49 7 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 647 F.2d 332 (1981), and cited in Wawa, 733
F.2d at 1544. McKenna involved the association of parent and child, a much more intimate
association for purposes of First Amendment analysis. See id. at 1222-23.
276 WiLson, 733 F,2d at 1544.
277 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
278
 Id. at 78.
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partnership on her merits." 279 The Court further noted that while it is
possible to characterize discrimination as involving freedom of associa-
tion, such discrimination has "'never been accorded affirmative con-
stitutional protections."' 28" As the Court explained, "W here is no con-
stitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who
may attend a private school or join a labor union." 28 ' Obviously, the
firm's partnership decision is a privilege of employment that is clearly
linked to a form of promotion.282 While this case clearly places employ-
ment rights guaranteed by Title VII above associated rights, without
some sort of link to the employer, it may be difficult to hold an
employer liable fbr purely social activities, 283
CONCLUSION
With the current backlash against affirmative action and other
efforts to bring more women and minorities into the workplace, 284
there seems to be little hope of expansion by Congress of employment
rights laws to encompass additional employment practices. While the
existence of the Glass Ceiling Commission does give women and mi-
norities some hope that glass ceiling related problems may someday
be addressed by Congress, the wait may be long. In the meantime, Title
VII is still the best hope for shattering the glass ceiling,
Reindeer games, a particular manifestation of employer practices
that create the glass ceiling, can be addressed through the use of
current Title VII jurisprudence. There are three principle ways to use
Title VII to combat reindeer games. First, the courts could simply find
that reindeer games constitute a term, condition or privilege of em-
ployment under Title VII. Certainly, some forms of reindeer games, for
example, when they are employer-sponsored, would fall within the
terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Second, the courts
could hold other forms of reindeer games actionable because of their
279 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)).
280 hi. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1073)).
281 hi.
282 Hishon, 467 U.S. at 75-76.
289 A hill exploration of the associated rights implications is beyond the scope of this article.
It is sufficient that associated rights arguments would not bar all actions based on reindeer games.
284 See, e.g., Robert Shogan, Affirmative Action Stirs Unforeseen Division in GOP Series, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at Al. The recent California Civil Rights Initiative, which will arguably
operate to end affirmative action efforts by the State of California, is but one manifestation of
that backlash. See Dan Walters, 37-Word Bomb Ready to Wow, Sm.:it/mi.:NT() BEE, Nov. 5, 1995, at
A3.
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link with more traditional terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment. For example, if an employer consistently promotes males who
have played golf with the CEO, the reindeer game—golfing with the
boss—is linked to promotional opportunities. Therefore, a woman who
was not promoted could use the reindeer game to bolster her case,
either using it as direct evidence of discrimination or to show pretext. 285
Third, harassment law could be used to cover those situations in which
the reindeer games are not linked to another employment action but,
instead, are part of a pervasive employer policy that undermines the
ability of women to work. The conduct would have to be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. If women are
never asked to participate in reindeer games, which are either a fairly
consistent practice or sufficiently important—e.g., dinner with a very
important client—it could be viewed as harassment.
The potential for real gains to women by applying Title VII to
these practices remains to be seen. Thus far, litigants have not often
attempted to use reindeer games, and when they have done so, they
have met with mixed results. One of the policies behind Title VII is to
tear down arbitrary barriers to the advancement of women. 28" Applica-
tion of Title VII to reindeer games is consistent with this policy. To the
extent that the actions can be viewed as a more subtle (although not
so subtle from a woman's perspective) form of intentional discrimina-
tion, they certainly fall within Title VII's proscription of discrimination
in employment.
255
 Pretext becomes an issue in the McDonnell Douglas three-part inferential showing of
disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see also
Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Litigation, 30 GA. L.
Rev. 563 (1996) (discussing recent developments in disparate treatment law). After the plaintiff'
makes out her prima thcie case, the burden of production (not persuasion) shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802-03. If the employer meets this burden, the employee must furnish evidence of pretext. Id.
at. 804. The employee can do so directly, by showing that the employer more likely discriminated,
or indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered reasons are not credible. Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). But see Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993) (suggesting that showing that the employer's proffered reason is not credible
is not enough to carry the plaintiff's case). Evidence of reindeer games can be used to show that
the employer inure likely discriminated, because the employer showed a preference for men in
this regard and left women out.
286 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
